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INTRODUCTION 
The "Big Three" powers, the United States, Great Brita.in, 
and the Soviet Union, had successfully worked together to bring 
about the defeat of Germany, and ultimately the end of World War 
II. If not fast friends and allies, the powers had at least 
worked together to achieve a common goal. 
The post-war period, however, saw the end of this collabora-
tion. The Soviet Union was no longer concerned about cooperating 
with the West. Soviet interest returned to its goal of elimination 
of the non-Communist nations. George Ken,�an, the State Department 
expert on the Soviet Union described the Soviet policy of expan-
sion as: 
a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is 
permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main con­
cern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and 
cranny available to it in the basin of world power. 
But if it finds unassaila.ble barriers in its path, it 
accepts these philosophically and accomodates itself 
to them. The main thing is that there should always 
be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the 
desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in 
Soviet psychology that the goal must be reached at any 
given time. 
Faced with this new Soviet challenge, the United States need-
ed to develop a method of countering it. The countermeasure de-
veloped was a policy of "containment". It was a long term program 
lJohn W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controvers and the 
Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 19 5 , p. 257. 
1 
2 
of patient, but firm and vigilant resistance to Soviet moves. It 
did not have as its objective the destruction of the Soviet Union 
and its satellites ,  but the creation of a balance of power which 
would keep the Soviet Union's aggressive tendencies in check. 1 
This new policy of containment, while successful in counter­
ing Soviet offensive moves was not popular in the United States. 
Since the founding of the United States and Washington's admonita­
tion not to become entangled in foreign alliances, Americans had 
looked upon domestic development as their primary concern .  Any 
excursions into the realm of foreign affairs had been considered 
temporary diversions. 
In the past when the United States had gone to war, it had 
been a noble crusade, a war to correct a moral wrong. The nation 
had harnessed its full war potential and had brought it to bear 
on the enemy who had diverted the United St�tes' attention from 
the more important internal affairs. After the enem.y had been 
crushed, the nation would once more turn it's full attention to 
domestic pursuits. 
The containi�ent policy, however, did not make such a clear 
cut distinction between war and peace. The United States found 
itself in a position where it could not completely withdra.w to 
the world of domestic affairs, nor could it harness the full 
energy of its war machine and defeat the enemy. 
Unfortunately for the Administration, however well the con­
tainment policy was working, all the public saw was the unexcit­
ing generalities of "collective security" and not a dynamic 
--------- -----�-------
lspanier, Controversy, p. 257. 
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presenta_tion of comprehensive Western stratl'!gy. 1 Unlike the 
earlier llnl ted States .._dven.tures into the realm of foreign aff:drs, 
containment did not sho1v- any in:unediate and outward si;sns of succ'"!ss. 
Th'.ls in the public's mind containment became eque<ted with f;dlure. 
The United States involvement in the Korean War tended to 
point up even more dramatically the differences between the tradi-
tional policy •md the policy of containment. Instead of committ-
ing the full military misht of the nation to the complete and 
immediate destruction of the enemy, the Administration was fight-
ing a nlimited war11• A war which the United States for all of its 
military mi::;ht seemed un�ble to win. This lack of :my measurable 
success in Korea resulted in a growing sense of public frustration. 
The event which brought this feeling of animosity to the surface 
was President Tru.man•s dismissal of General MacArthur from his Far 
Eastern COl1ll11».nds. Public reaction, as President Truman had antici-
pated, was immediate and vociferous. The President's action met 
with �- stor:!'ll of disapproval throughout the nation. Therefore, 
the purpose of this paper is to examine the public reaction to the 
recall of MacArthur and to determine the factors responsible for 
this reversal. 
lnavid Rees, Korea: The Limited War( New York: St. 1•'.i.D,rtin's 
Press, 1964), p. 281. 
I BUILDING A LIDJEND 
The Recall 
"I deeply r egret that • • • 0 and so it was that General of the 
Army Douglas MacArthur received the official order relieving him 
of all his commands. 
It was the afternoon of April 11, 19.51, and Senator Warren 
Magnuson and William Sterns, an airline official, were the guests 
of the NacArthurs at the American Embassy in Tokyo. During the 
luncheon Mrs. MacArthur was called to the door where she was told 
the news of the General ' s recall by one of MacArthur's aides, 
Colonel Sid Huff, who had just heard the news of the recall on 
the radio. Mrs. MacArthur took the news back to the General. 
Placing her hand on his shoulder, she whispered something in his 
ear. MacArthur turned, looked fondly at his wife and said, 
"Jeannie, we're going home at last". 1 Within a few rr..inutes 
Colonel Huff returned, this time c.arrying a brown Signal Corps 
envelope that cont.;dned the order that relieved MacArthur of all 
his commands. After fifty-two years in the service, Douglas Nae-
Arthur ceased to be on active duty. 
When the news of the General's recall became known in Tokyot 
the first reaction among those on his staff was shock and anger. 
lRobert B. Considine, The Life of General 
(Greenwich, Connecticut: .Fawcett Publications, 
4 
.5 
Alth�ugh most of MacArthur's staff in Tokyo recognized the extent 
to which the differences between Pre sident Harry S. 'I'ruman and the 
General had gn11e, they did not believe that anything could be done 
to }l.acArthur. 1 Perhaps a reprimand for the General would be 
forthcowing, but there was, as they saw it, not much anyone could 
or would dare to do to MacArthur. 
Later when questioned about MacArthur's reaction to the news 
o.f his recall , General Courtney Whitney said: 0I have just left him. 
H!'! received the news of the Presidents dismissal from command mag-
nificiently. He never turned a hair. His soldierly qualities were 
never more pronounced. 'rhis has been his finest hour". 2 
Shortly after the order of recall was received Ma.cArthur ' s 
headqua.rters issued a public statement under GeneN.l Whitney• s 
signature outlinin8 his view that MacArthur felt that he had com-
plied with all directives from Washington. Friday, April lJ, 
MacArthur's headquarters issued another statement to the effect 
that MacArthur had never advocated or considered extending the 
Korean War "except to the limited degree necessary" that would 
allow it to be ended honorably and with a minimum loss of life. 
MacArthur•s military secretary General Whitney said, "Led by the 
Conmnmist press, advocates of the genera.l policy of appeasement 
have attempted to slant their propaganda to the effect that General 
MacArthur has been an advocate of war expansion. Nothing could be 
lwilliam J. Sebald and Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan: 
A Personal History o�_the Occupation(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
Inc., 19b.5}, pp. 22J-24 •. 
2David Reese, Korea: The Limited War(New York: St. 1'101.rtin's 
Press, 1964), p. 220. 
6 
furth{')r from the truth." 1 
General HacArthur later recall•d the tenor of the dismissal 
message. 
The actual order I received was so drastic as to 
prevent the usual amenities incident to the trans­
fer of command , and practically pl�c•d me under 
duress. No office boy, no charwoman, no servant 
of any sort would havo been dismissed with such 
callous disregard for the ordinary decencies. 2 
Whitney commenting on th� recall sa.id: 
I have never seen the order committing Napoleon to 
exile, but I dare say that it exuded greater warmth 
and was couched in terms reflecting higher honor 
than that which authorized MacArthur to spend the 
public funds necessary to take him to an oblivian 
of his own selection . 3 
¥.Lili tary Career 
MacArthur's career was a brilliant one and it was this brill-
iance that led to its end. During the 19L1-0•s MacArthur was per-
mitted to become more than a soldier. When in 1950 Truman tried 
to place him in the position of a mere theater commirnder he could 
no longer fit. 4 In order to understand the effect of the career 
upon the man it is nec!!lssary to examine MacArthur's service record. 
lNew York Times, April 13, 1951, p. 6. 
2Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1964), p. 395. 
3courtney Whitn�y, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), PP• 479-80. 
-
4Ernest R. May, The Ultimate Decision: The President as 
Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960), p. 207. 
7 
The Class of 1903 at the United States Military Academy con-
tained among the other brand new second lieutenants a young Lieu-
tenant Douglas MacArthur, the son of a Civil War hero , Lieutena.nt­
General Arthur MacArthur. 1 Douglas MacArthur ranked first in his 
clta.ss with the incred�able four year schola.stic a.verage of 98.14. 
For his first assignment he was sent to the Philippine Isl.;mds 
where he work�d with the Army Corps of Engineers. It was there 
that MacArthur received his first battle experience fi�hting with 
the Moros who had been harrassing the Engineers and their crews 
as they tried to complete their work. In 1905, MacArthur, then a 
first lieutenant, was assiened to the Far East where he served as 
an aide to his father, who was tht!l American milihry observer 
th1're. Between 1906 and 1914 MacArthur spent time at the White 
House '"-S an aide to his father• s good friend President ·i'heodore 
Roosevelt. He quickly tired of the White House duty and was allow-
ed to go w'ith the United States expedition to Veracruz, Hexico in 
1914, whsn the united States Army seized control of th:;it city. 
With the entry of the United States into the F:i.rst World W:..r, 
�:'.acArthur, th·�n a Major on staff duty, origin"-ted the idea of a 
"Rainbow Division" of National Guard troops from various states. 
Going ov�r the heads of his superior officers, MacArthur sold the 
ide;. to Newton D. Bakl"r, then Secretary of War. In 1917, NacArthur 
went with the "Rainbow Divisionu to France. At thf'l end of the war, 
lFor the biographical material the author has relied upon Robert 
Considine, The Life of Gene,rj.l Douglas MacArthur; Clarke Newlon, 'l'he 
Fighting Douglas MacArthur; Douglas .MacArthur, Reminiscences; "'bttoo 
for a Warrior, 11 �· April 23, 1951, PP• 30-JJ. 
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MacArthur, who had been wounded twice, won two Distinguished Service 
Crosses, eleven other decoration8,seven citations for bra.very, and 
twenty-four foreign decorations. He now held the rank of a briga.-
dier general and was placed in connna.nd of a division. 
At the age of thirty-nine he returned to the United States 
to become Superintendant of the United States Military Academy. 
In 1925, he served on the Billy Mitchell Court-Martial Board, and 
he later claimed to be the only one who cast a vot e in favor of 
Mitchell. l 
At fifty, MacArthur, now the youngest Chief of Staff in his-
tory, experienced a period of extreme unpopularity when he per-
sonally supervised the disbanding of the Bonus Army when it march-
ed upon wa.shin�ton in 1932. He remained as Chief of Staff until 
December 15, 1935. 
After his retirement from that post, MacArthur was loaned to 
the Philippine Islands as a military adviser . On August 24, 1936, 
he received another honor when he was made Field Marshall of the 
Commonwealth Army. 
On July 26, 1941, just a little over four months before Pearl 
Harbor, Roosevelt recalled ?1acArthur to active duty with the rank 
of Lieutenant-General and the title of CoI!lll'lander of United States 
Forces in the Far East. Eleven days after the attack on Pearl 
lBilly Mitchell w�.s an outspoken advocate of the use of air 
power. When the artey' did not accept his views on the value of air 
power, he became increasingly outspoken in his criticism of the 
military.climaxing in September 1925, when he publicly accused the 
war and navy departments of ttincompetency, criminal negligence and 
almost treasonable administration of the National Defense." In 
December 1925, an army court-martial convicted him of insubordina­
tion and suspended him from rank and duty for five years. He re­
signed from the arnry on February 1, 1926. 
9 
Harbor, MacArthur gained his fourth star and became a full g eneral 
on December 19, 1941. 
In the Second World War MacArthur established himself as a 
legend in the South Pacific. On Bataan in early 1942, at the age 
of sixty-two, he suffered the first serious defeat of his career. 
Superior Japanese forces pushed l"lacArthur slowly down the Philippine 
peninsula until finally under orders from President Roosevelt, Mac-
Arthur and his family left Corregidor for Australia. Upon his 
arrival in Australia, MacArthur found waiting for him, the Con-
gressional Medal of Honor, for his work in the Philippines and the 
five-star rank of General of the Army, as Supreme Commander, Allied 
Forces, Pacific. 
In late 1942, MacArthur began his offensive drive to defeat 
the Japanese in the Pacific. Unable to pierce the powerful Jap-
anese positions by a frontal assault, MacArthur resorted to a type 
of campaign popularly called "leapfrogging." This system of war-
fare avoided frontal attacks on enemy strongholds where possible . 
Instead, they were simply neutralized by cutting their supply 
lines, leaving the Japanese forces on the isl�nd helple ss and 
starving. MacArthur describing his Pacific campaign said: 
To successfully envelop the enemy called for the 
careful selection of key points as objectives and the 
choosing of the most opportune moment to strike. I 
accordingly applied my major efforts to the seizure of 
areas which were suitable for airfields and base de­
velopment, but which were only lightly defended by th• 
enemy. Thus, by daring forward strikes, by neutraliz­
ing and by-passing enemy centers of strength, and by 
the judicious use of my air forces to cover each move­
ment, I intended to destroy Japanese power in New 
Guinea and adjacent isla.nds, and to clear the way for 
a drive to the Philippines. 1 
------- --- - --·-- --
l:t-t.:.acArthur, p. 169. 
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Workin� his way back across the South Pacific, on October 20, 1944, 
MacArthur returned to the Philippine Islands ju.st as he had promised. 
On September 2, 1945, on the deck of the battleship Missouri, 
l".lacArthur accepted the "unconditional surr$nder" of Japan. He then 
became Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan for fj_ve 
and one-half years� As the Supreme Commander in Japan, MacArthur 
was not the head of state, that title still belonged to the Emperor, 
but in point of fact, MacArthur assumed several of the functions 
of the head of state. Operating through tho channels of the JaP­
anese government itself, MacArthur was able to control Japanese 
political life, or even set the goYernment a.side and rule by direct 
military order if necessary. He had full authority to direct for­
eign policy, military policy, and :military operations in Japan. 
MacArthur's powers were so broad in scope that he was actually 
£!. facto ruler of Japan. 
Some of MacArthur's critics later contended that the vast 
powers he had exercised in Japan , coupled with the minimum regu­
lation from Washington were partially responsible for his dis­
missal. They alleged that his direction of foreign policy, mili­
tary policy , and military operations in Japan. for such a long 
period of time le� him incapable of distinguishing between the 
three areas and was thus indirectly responsible for his over­
stepping his authority in Korea. 
¥.acArthur and Korea 
It was a little after 10:00 p.m. Saturday, June 24, 1950, 
when President Truman r�ceived word of the surprise attack of the 
North Korean People's Army on the Republic of Korea. Word of the 
11 
attack had been flashed from Korea to Washington .and then to Inde-
pendence, Missouri , where the President had gone for the weekend. 
Then and there th• United States was faced with two choices: it 
could allow the Communist government of North Korea to take over 
South Korea or it could act to repell the Communist aggressors. 
Truman chose to act--to meet the Communist challenge. 
Truman saw Korea as a Soviet test of the Western determina-
tion to stand up to the Communist advances. President Truman 
felt that if South Korea were allowed to fall to Communism, the 
Communist leaders would gradually become bolder and bolder in 
their aggression until the world would be involved in a third 
l world war. Truman recalled that on the part of his advisers 
there was "complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of 
everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression, 
had to be done." 2 
One of the key principles of the Truman Administration's 
foreign policy entailed major support of the United Nations and 
working closely with the European nations in matters of common 
defense. 3 Ths North Korean attack was "the test of all the talk 
of the last five years of collective security." 4 The State De-
partment and the Defense Department, working closely together, 
developed, at the request of President Truman, a list of recommend-
lHarry S. Truman, Msmoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope 
1946-1952 (New York: Signet Books, 1965), p. 379. 
2Ibid., p. J81. 
31ouis W. Koeing ( ed. ) , The Truman Administration: Its Principles 
and Practices (New York: New York University Press, 1956), p. 266. 
4rruman, p. 381. 
12 
ations for meeti:1g the North Korean ;i,ttack. 'l'he quest.ion raised in 
high administration circl e s was not whether force would have to be 
em}'.Jloyed, but how much force would be needed. During the first few 
hours of the fight it was thought that the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
forces, assisted by American Air Force and Naval units would be 
sufficient to repulse the North Korean attack . Since no one in 
Washington had a really clear picture of the situation in Korea, 
Truman ordered General MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers 
in Japan, to send a survey party to Korea to assess the situation 
and to •stimate the amount of military aid which would be required. 
When the nt11ws of the North Korean atta.ck :md the United Sta.tes 
determination to meet it rea.ched the public, President Truma,n • s 
actions were widely acclaimed. Congressional and public opinion 
were squarely behind the President.l Although some Congressmen 
w"3re to l<0,ter ch:<1lenge the constitutionality of Truman's actions, 
except for Robert A. Taft, there were no objections raised at the 
time. 
By 1-'.onday, June 26, the collapse of the ROK forces was 
i1r.1.-rninent unless something was done to help them. In a effort to 
bolster the sagging South Kor®an forc�s, President Truman ordered 
General :MacArthur to use Amflrican air .and naval power to support 
the ROK Army, but to limit the operations of the American forces 
to the artta south of thl"' 35th Parallel. l'-'l.acArthur, on Jun" 29, 
after pl'!rsona,lly flying to Korea on an inspection trip warned that 
unl"ss American ground troops were sent to Korea to support the ROK 
--- -
lJ<:-=ric 11'. Goldman, The Cr1lcial Decade: Ame�:!:,ca, 194-,2-1955 (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 157-58. 
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Army, it would be unable to hold the Communist forces at their 
present position at the Han River. President Truman immediately 
followed the general's recommendation and in a press release on 
June 30, President Trrunan announced that 
he had authorized the United States Air Forc e +.o con­
duct missions on specific military targ ets in North 
Korea wherever militarily necessary and had ordered a 
Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. General 
MacArthur has been authorized to use certain ground 
units. l 
Following the President's policy of international cooperation, 
the United r:ations had oeen informed of the situation in Korea and 
of the President's actions--which received mnch a.claim from U.N. 
members. Acting upon the urging of the A.l'llerican ambassador, a 
special meeting of the United Nations Security Council was called 
to deal with the Korean situation. On June 25, the Security Council 
passed a resolution that urged both parties to the conflict to stop 
fiz;hting and to return to the status guo. When this resolution 
was ignored the United Nations took the next logical step in its 
efforts to maintain the peace. It, on June 27, called upon its 
members to "furnish such assistance to the RepubJ.j c of' lforee es 
may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore inter­
national peace and security in the area." 2 On July 7, the Secur-
ity Council passed another resolution which created a unified 
command for those forces contributed as a result of the second 
United Nations resolu.tion, and authorized the use of the United 
Nations Flag by this command. The resolution also asked that the 
------ --------·---··--·----- --��--··----
lJ ohn W. Spanier , 'fhe Truman-Mac.A£thyr Con_!-.roversy and the 
Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965), p. ,31. 
2Ibid., p. 36. 
United States designate the cornMander of the 1iri i.fied force and 
that it provide tha Security Council with reports , as appropriate, 
on the course of action taken by tM.s military command. Thus the 
American stand in Korea , supporting a new United States policy of 
containment, had become a crusade for collective security by the 
United Nations. Korea had resulted in a cooperative venture by the 
United States and the United Nations, a marriage of efforts, so to 
speak, for better or for worse . 
It was only the absence of the delegate of the Soviet Union 
to the Security Council , due to a Soviet boycott of the world 
organization, that enabled it to take such speedy and forthright 
action. It did not become bogged down by the usual prolonged de­
bate and ultimately the Soviet veto. Of course, when the Soviet 
Union returned to the Security Council they protested the action, 
calling it illegal . Their protests , however, were in vain, for 
just as the United States intervention had actually come before the 
United Nations resolution authorizing such action, the Soviet Union 
upon its return was presented with a � accompli. 
In response to the July 8 United Nations resolution, President 
'fruman appointed General of the Arrr:y Douglas MacArthur Commander 
in Chief of the Unified Command. 
Military Operations 
Due to their careful preparation and the element of surprise , 
the North Korean forces had managed to push the South Korean forces 
to the southern end of the Korean peninsula and for a time it appear­
ed that the ROK forces might be pushed off the peninsula alto-
15 
gether. 1 As more United States forces became available and were 
sent into the Korean battleground the resistance to the North Kor-
ean A:rrrry stiffened and their offensive began to slow down until on 
August 5. 1950, it came to a halt. The United Nations force s  had 
managed to stabalize a defense perimeter around the port of Pusan 
and the United Nations retreat had come to an end. The tide had 
begun to turn in favor of the United Nations as they gradually 
built up their forces until they were ready to launch a counter-
offensive. On September 15, General MacArthur in a brilliant 
amphibious operation landed troops at Inchon, on the western coast 
of Korea, in a move that took the �orth Korean•s by complete sur-
prise. 
MacArthur's forces then began to drive eastward acro ss the 
peninsula. The North Korean troops surprised by the Inchon land-
ings found themselves cut off and surrounded by the United Nations 
troops. Breaking ranks in large numbers, thousands of the Communist 
troops began surrendering to the U.N. forces; others began to run 
northward for the 3sth Parallel and the safety north of it. 
Turning northward. the U.N. forc es quickly reached the 3sth 
Parallel, the place where it had all started, on September 30. 
The United Nations was then faced with deciding whether to cross 
the Parallel and proceed into North Korea or not . The Chinese 
Communists had warned the United Nations that if U.N. forces enter-
ed North Korea, she would come into the war. This gave the United 
lFor military history of the Korean War, the author has re­
lied upon Eric Goldman, '1'he Crucial Decade; Leland M. Goodrich, 
Korea : A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations ; Cabell Phillips, 
The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession; 
David Reese, Korea : 'rhe Limited War; John W. Spanier, The Trum.an­
MacArthur Controve�!!l� the Korean War. 
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Nations cause for serious thought. General .MacArthur's G-2 ( in­
telligence section) said it felt that the Chinese Communists were 
only bluffing and that it did not believe that China would enter 
the war at this late stage with the defeat o.f North Korea eminent. 
On October ?, the United Nations passed a new resolution that in­
dicated that the U.N. force s should proc eed into North Korea. 
"All appropriate steps (shoulc1] be taken to ensure conditions of 
stability" in Korea.1 With the L�mediate goal of repulsing the 
North Korean forces accomplished, the United States goal of a 
militarily united Korea came into sight. 2 The emphasis of the 
war had changed from a defensive one, that of defending the in­
tegrity of South Korea, to an offensive one in an effort to achieve 
a permanent change in the status gu.o. 
The Chinese Communist government had announced several times, 
both publicly and privately that if the U.N. troops crossed the 
33th Parallel that the Chinese people would not tolerate this for­
eign aggression. The U.N. troops, however, crossed the parallel 
and swept northward toward the Yalu River. The Chinese Communists, 
as they had warned they would do, began to send men into North Kor­
ea.. Starting about October 14, the first of what was to event­
ually amount to around a third of a million men began to slip over 
the bridg e s at An.tung and Manpojin and enter North Korea undetected. 
Gradually the Chinese forces began to enter the fighting a­
gainst the United Nations forces. Rumors of the Chinese forces 
engaging in the fighting had been noating about for some time 
1 Rees, p. 101. 
2spanier , Controversy, p. 91. 
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s o  when news of the s e  nei-; Chinese Communist forces reached Toky o ,  
it W'l s simply shrugged off a s  just ano ther rumor . Even when s ome 
Chinese CorrJnunist s oldiers were captured in battle , the possibility 
of larg e scale Chine s e  in terventi on was di s c ounted. 
Th e U . N .  for c e s  meanwhil e continued to swe ep northward meet-
in,:; only minor resi stance . On November 24 , victory wa s in sight 
a s  Ma cArthur launched his last major offensive and wa s anticipating 
a quick clean up operation and havi 11g most of the boys home (Mac-
Arthur was refering to Japan for mo st of the U . S .  s oldiers ) for 
Chris tmas dinner . The second day o f  the U . N . offensive was met 
with a mas s ive Chin e s e  Communist counteratta c k .  Swarming over the 
U . N .  forces in �reat numbers the Chines e  forced the U . N .  troops 
back,  further and further until they managed to hold a de fens ive 
position a little to the s outh of the 3ath Parallel . 
The staggering losses in both men and equipment made Mac-
Arthur the sub j ect of a 3 reat d eal of public criticism in the 
United Stat e s . A man with MacArthur ' s  out standing service rec ord 
should have been able to take such criticism in his stride , but 
he had devel oped what was almos t  a c ompulsi on to maintain hi s 
record without a spot . Rational i zing to himself he foun d it easy 
l to plac e  the bl ame for his defeat on Washington . Thus in N ov-
ember MacArthur released his first ma j or verbal barrage against 
the Administration.  On N ovember 28 , he s ent a cablegram to Ray 
Henle of the Three Star Extra newsbroadcast . On N ovember 30 , he 
replied t o  a mes sage from Arthur Krock of the � � Times . He 
sent a lengthy me s sage to Hugh Baill e ,  president of the United 
1�. , pp . 148-49 .  
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Pre s s  and granted an int erview to the editors of the U . S . News and - - -
� Report on December 1 .  He al s o  s ent mes sages t o  Ward Price 
of the London Daily !1!!1; Barry Fari s , manag ing editor of the In-
1 ternational N ews Service ; and the Tokyo Pres s  Corps . 
The Seeds are S own 
When President Truman appointed MacArthur as Commander in 
Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea he had unwittingly 
s own the s eeds of the controver sy that would later l ead to his 
having to recall the General from c ommand . Truman said : 
From the very beg inning of the Korea n acti on ,  I 
had always looked at it a s  a Rus sian maneuver ,  as part 
of the Kremlin ' s plan to destroy the unity of the free 
world . NATO , the Russians knew, would suc ceed only if 
the United States took part in the defense o f  R'urope . 
The easiest way to keep us from doing our share in NATO 
wa s to draw us int o military c on flict in Asia . We 
could not deny military aid to a victim of Communi st 
aggre s sion in Asia unless we wanted other small nations 
to swing into the Soviet camp for fear of aggression 
which , alone , they c ould not resist.  At the s ame time , 
it served to weaken us on a global plane and that , of 
course , was Rus sia ' s  aim. 2 
MacArthur , on the other hand , s aw Korea not as a side is sue , 
but as the main event. He saw Asia a s  the center of the world 
wide struggle with Communism. 
It seems s trang ely difficult for s ome to reali z e  that 
here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have 
el ected to make their play for global conquest , and that 
we have joined the i ssue thus raised on the battlefield ; 
that here we fig ht Europe ' s  war with arms while the 
dipl omats there still fight it with words ; that i f  we 
l o s e  the war to Communism in Asia , the fall of Europe 
is inevitable ; win it and Europe most probably would 
avoid war and yet pres erve freedom . 3 
libid . , p .  149 .  
2Truman , p .  496. 
3�...a.cArthur , P •  386. 
---· - -·------ ----
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He saw the •·�ar a s  providi;ng _the United States with a great opportun-
- ity to inflict a limited , but s ever e blow to the Sino-Sovi et bl.ock 
while demonstrating American determinati on and power . 1 
Even before the Chinese entered the war there wa s a certain 
amount of fr i ction b etween the United N ations Commander in Tokyo 
a"d the President . Gen eral tacArthur was respon s ible for dee.ling 
with the mil itary aspects of the Korean war ; Truman , however ,  had 
to deal n ot only with thi s , but he also  had to contend with the 
probl ems involved in pres erving the support of the United Nations 
in Korea . The United !fati ons provided the shield o f  political 
respectab ility that jus ti fied the United States military pre s ence 
in Korea . 
On s everal oc casions MacArthur had embarrassed the admini-
stration before the world by g iving the impression that the United 
States spoke with two voice s ,  a civilian one and a military one . 
Thi s tended to con fus e the allies and to make them all the more 
reluctant to follow the l ead o f  American policy as time pas sed . 
rhey began to fear that the g overnment could not c ontrol Ma cArthur 
and he might plunge the United Nations into a.n unwanted war . 2  
The firs t  oY Ha.cArthur • s  embarrassments to the administration 
came with hi s vi sit to Formosa and Chiang Kai- shek . In late July , 
1950 , MacArthur went to Formosa to check on the Nationalist troop s 
and their ability to de fend themselve s in the event of an attack 
from the mainland . After the visit MacArthur releas ed a c ommunique 
in whi ch he expres s ed warm prai se for Chiang and his displ easur e 
at the unwillingnes s  o f  the United States t o  make any use of 
ls · � t 266 pani;r , on roversy ,  p.  • 
2Ibid • •  p .  267 . 
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Chiang ' s  forces . 
Truman s aw a need t o  make clear to MacArthur the united State s  
policy , not onl,y in Korea , but the overall global strategy . Thus 
on August 3 ,  Truman s ent Aver ell Harriman t o  Tokyo to " enlighten" 
�fia.cArthur . After two days of dis cus sion with MacArthur , Harriman 
returned to Washington . He said in his report to •rruman that Mac-
Arthur had agreed with the United State s decis ion to intervene in 
Korea , and that he would ultimately be able to de str oy the North 
Korean for ce s . Harriman quoted MacArthur a s  saying that he did 
not b elieve either Communis t China or the Soviet uni on would help 
N orth Korea by entering the war directly . MacArthur ag ain express-
ed his unhappin e s s  over Wa shington ' s  treatment of Chiang Kai- shek . 
H.arriman , in his report , stat ed 
F'or rea s ons whi ch are rather diffi cult to explain , I do 
not feel that we came to a full agre ement on the way we 
believed thing s should be handled on Formosa and with 
the Generali s simo . He a c c epted the Pre sident ' s  position 
1 and will ac t a ccordingly , but without full c onviction • • •  
On Augu st 26 , MacArthur sent a messag e  to the Vetrans of For-
e ign Wars in which he outl ined his program for a Far Eastern policy 
which was in c omplete oppos ition to that of the administration .  
He c oncluded his state�ent by implying that the admini stration ' s  
handling o f  Chiang Kai- shek was " appeasement" . 
N othing c ould be more fallacious than the threadbare 
argument by tho s e  who advocate appeas ement and def eat­
i sm in the Pa cifi c , that if we defend Formo s a ,  we 
alienate c ontinental Asia . 2 
l:walter ¥lilli s ,  Arms and the State : Civil-H�!_itary Elements 
in National Policy (New York : Twentieth Century Fund, 1958� , p .  269. 
2vorin E. Whan , Jr . ( ed. ) , A S oldier Spe aks : Public Papers 
and Spee ches o f  General of the Ar Dou las Mac.Arthur ( New York : 
Frederick Praeg er , 19 .5 , p .  221 . 
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The Pre sident ordered MacArthur to  withdraw the sta.ternent . which he 
did immediately , but s everal of the news mag azines had already print-
ed it . 
The next c ontact b etween the Pre sident and his Far Eastern Com-
mander came in October when Truman fl ew to Wake Island for a con-
ference with MacArthur . Truman hoped that he might have b etter lu ck 
in g etting Ma cArthur to s e e  the world pi cture . 
Events s in ce June had shown me that MacArthur had l ost 
s ome of his c ontacts with the country and it s peopl e in the 
many years of hi s ab sence .  He had b e en in the Ori ent for 
nearly fourteen years then , and all his thought s were 
wrapped up in the Ea.st . I had made efforts through Harri­
man and other s to let him s ee the world-wide picture as 
we saw it in Washington . but I felt that we had had little 
succe s s . I thought he might adjust more easily if he 
heard it from me directly . 1 
The actual meeting at Wake Island took place on Sunday , October 
15 .  The a ctual conference didn ' t  accompli s h  much . MacArthur re-
stated his vi ew that the Korean War would be over by Thanksgiving 
and that the Chinese would not c ome into the war ag ain s t  the United 
Nations . 
The entrance of the Chine s e  Connnunists in the Korean War made 
a re- evaluation of United States poli cy in Korea neces sary ,  for 
Congressional pressure ag ainst the Pr e s ident ' s  foreign policy had 
been steadily mounting . It was at this t ime that G eneral MacArthur 
b egan issuing s tatements calling for an expan sion o f  the war ag ainst 
China and implying that the achninistration policy in Korea was one 
of  appeasement . 
On December 6 ,  Truman is sued an order to all g overnment 
agencies that until further noti c e  all speeche s , pres s  releas e s , or 
other public statements con cerning foreign pol i cy were to b e  cl eared 
lTruman ,  p .  414 . 
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with the State Department in advanc e ;  and that o fficials over s e a s  
wer e  t o  clear all but routine statements with the ir departments .  
Although �e had received a directive against uncleared public 
statements , on March ? .MacArthur i s sued a public statement in which 
he complained of the " abnormal military inhibitionstt and said that 
a lfmilitary stalemate was inevitable . 0  
In late Harch the dispute between the Pre sident and hi s general 
came to a head . The Joint Chi e fs of Staff advised MacArthur that 
the Pre sident was planning to announ ce that the United Nations wa s 
prepa.red to discus s c onditions of s ettlement in Korea . On March 24 ,  
General 1-lacArthur , fully aware o f  the forthc oming Presidential 
announc ement , issued a statement in which he announced that he 
stood ready to me et in the field with the commander in chief of 
the enemy force s and he implied that i f  China did not admit that 
she had lost the war , the United Nations might increase the pres sure 
on the Communist forc e s and pre s s for a clearcut victory.  
Upon hearing of liacArthur ' s statement , ·rrurnan became angry 
and he directed the Joint Chiefs to call General l':acArthur ' s  atten­
tion to the Decemher directive . On April 5 ,  Repres entative Jos eph 
Martin , Jr . ( k-Mass . ) ,  the Hou s e  Minority Leader , made public a 
letter from MacArthur that s e emed to agre e with Martin ' s  demand 
to use Nationalist Chinese troops to open a second front on the 
Korean War .  It wa s a t  this point that Pre sident Truman de cided 
that MacArthur had gone too far and would have to be r emoved from 
c ommand . J etween April 6 and 9 ,  the President held c onferences 
with top administrat i on officials t o  see what they thought should 
2J 
be done about EacArthur . 1 
On April 10 , President Truman offic ially relieved General Hae-
Arthur of all his commands . 
111The Real Story of MacArthur : How and Why Mr . Truman Dj c;_ 
mis sed Himn , U . S. News and World Report , April 20 , 1951 , p .  21 . 
II MACARTHUR RETURNS 
Tuesday ,  April 10 , the lights burned late in the office o f  
the Pre sidential Pre s s  Secretary . His staff was busy c ontacting 
the White House reporters . They simply t old the reporters that 
the White House would have an important announcement at 1 : 00 a . m .  
Sharply a t  12 : 56 a . m. o n  what was then Wednesday morning , 
Presidential Pre s s  Secretary Joe Short broke the news that Presi-
dent Truman had relieved General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of 
all o f  his c omm.ands .  1 Short read : 
With deep regret I have c on cluded that General of 
the Army Douglas NacArthur is unable to give his whole­
hearted support to the policies of the United Stat e s  
Government and of the United Nations in matters per­
taining to his official duties .  In view of the specific 
responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution 
of the United States and the added responsibility which 
has been entrusted to me by the United Nations , I have 
decided that I must make a chang e of c ommand in the Far 
East .  I have , there fore , relieved General MacArthur of 
his c ommands and have designated Lieutenant General 
Matthew B .  Ridg eway as his suc c e s sor . 
Full and vig orous debate on matters of nati onal 
policy is a vital element in the c onstitutional system 
of our free democracy. It is fundamental , however , that 
military c ommanders must. be governed by the policies and 
directives i s sued to them in the manner provided by our 
laws and Constitution .  In time of cri sis , the consider­
ation is particularly compelling . 
------ ---- · ------·- -.-...- . -�·--·--- ---.. - ---
lunited Nations Commander ; United States Commander in Chief ,  
Far East ; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan ; 
Commanding G eneral , United States Army , Far East . 
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General MacArthur ' s  place in history as one of 
our greatest c ommanders i S  fully estaolished . 'rhe na­
tion owes him a debt of graditude for the distii:guish­
ed and exceptional s ervice which he ha. s rendered his 
c ountry in posts of great respons ibility .  For thi s 
reas on I rep eat my regret at the necessity for the 
action I feel compelled to take in this case . l 
He then g ave them a sheath of mimeographed do cuments c ontaining 
c opies of the actual order of recall sent to General MacArthur , 
the December 6 directive , the Pre sident ' s  me s sage o f  January 12 
to the General , and oth er directives and memos bearing on the 
c onflict . Then he told the reporters that the Presid ent would g o  
o n  the air at 10 : 30 p . m .  Wednesday evening t o  explain his action 
to the American peopl e .  The announcement took only s even minute s  
and then at  1 : 03 a . m. the reporters rushed t o  the telephones and 
filed the story with their offices . The next morning when the 
nati on learned of the news , the reaction , as Pre sident Truman had 
anticipated , was immediate and loud . 
Political Reaction 
Representative Martin was awakened at 1 : 30 a . m .  by an angry 
woman that had called from Conne cticut to tell him how terrible 
she thought it was for President Truman t o  have done such a thing 
to Gen eral NacArthur . The call wa s the first Martin had heard of 
the news , but by 2 : 00 a . m. he had heard the news twice more . Hi s 
second caller had been Cong r e s sman Dewey Short ( D-Mo . ) and the third 
a lady in Yakima , Washine;ton . Congres smen and s enators all over 
Washington were r oused out of o ed by reporters eag er to get their 
reaction at the news of the dismi ssal. In most ca se s the official 
had not heard the news until the reporter told him of it . Some 
lTruman , p .  509 . 
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official s like Carl Vins on s imply hung up after having given the 
reporter a lecture on the time of the morning . Others , like Wis-
c on s in ' s  Sena.tor Alexander Wiley ,  made typically non- committal 
statement s such as , "Now is a time when we must weigh our words . 11 1 
Still other prominent figure s  were less res erved in their comments .  
Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn said that the military i s  
sub j e ct t o  t h e  c ontrol of the civilian administration and that we 
must never give up that idea . Republican Senator William Jenner 
was quoted as saying that impeachment of Pre sident Truman wa s the 
only choic e  l e � . General Dwight D .  Eis enhower said that when one 
put on a uniform he automatically ac cepted certain inhibitions ; 
he als o  expre s s ed the hope that General MacArthur would not return 
t o  the United States and become a center of controver sy. 2 
Senator Joseph McCarthy , speaking in Milwaukee ,  Wis c onsin 
strongly implied that the Pre s ident • s  deci s i on wa s fogged with 
"bourbon and benedictine" . "The s on of a bitch , 11 said Mc Carthy, 
although he later denied it , " ought t o  be impeached" . 3 
.Mr s . Eleanor Roos evelt said that she did not think that a 
g eneral should be allowed to make policy. Senator James H.  Duff 
( R-Pa . )  said that if MacArthur ' s  di smi s sal was the only way to 
accomplish unity it had to be done , and that to permit a c on­
tinued di spute as t o  authority and military policy during this 
period was unthinkable .  4 Senator Richard M. Ni xon ( R- Calif . ) 
stated that the di smissal of General MacArthur was an act of 
- ---
1 "Tattoo for a Warrior , "  Life 1 April 23 , 1951 , P •  36. 
2 "What They Said , "  �. April 23 , 19.51 , p . 28 .  
3 n rattoo for a Warrior , 0  Life 1 April 23 , 19.51 , p . 37 . 
4,,\"/nat They Said , 11 �. April 2) . 19.51 , p .  28 .  
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appeas ement of the Communists and that the Senate should c ensure 
the President and demand the reinstatement of General MacArthur . 1 
He said , "President Truman has given them just what they were 
after--Ma.cArthur ' s  s calp . "  2 
·rhe Hou s e  of Repre s entati 1res heard Pres ident Truman ' s  e.ction 
called "the greate st victory for the Communists since the fall of 
China . "  ·rhe Republican Policy Committee asked whether the Truman-
Ache s on-Marshall triumvirante was preparing for a "super-Munich" 
. . . 3 in .Li.S J.a . 
Senator William J enn er went even further on the floor of the 
Senate when he charged : 
This c ountry today is in the hands of a s e cret inner 
coterie whi ch is directed by ag ents of the Soviet Union . 
We must out this whole can c er ous c onspiracy out of our 
Government at onc e .  Our only c ourse i s  t o  impeach 
Pres ident Truman and find out who is the s e cret invisi­
ble g overnment which has s o  cl
�
verly led our country 
down the road to destruction . 
Former Pre sident Herbert Hoover s ent the following mes sage to 
MacArthur in Tokyo , ° Fly home a s  quickly a s  possible before Truman 
and Marshall and their crowd of propagandists can smear you . u 5 
Just as Congre s s  was split over Pres ident Truman ' s  action , 
state l egislatures too were debating the re call . 6 
lRee s , p .  222 . 
2111,.lhat 'rhey Said , 11 Time , April 23 , 1951 , p .  28 . 
3Ree s , p .  222 . 
4�. 
5Fra zier Himt , The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur( il! ew 
York : Daven-Adair Company , 19.54 ) , p .  518. 
6New York Time s , April 13 , 1951 , P •  5. 
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The Texa s Legislature , in Austin , was c on s idering a res olution 
that invited General t{acArthur to addres s a j oint session o f  the 
l egislature . The res oluti on stated tha.t the legislature needed 
and de s ired the in formation that the G eneral could give it . The 
Wis cons in Senate by a voice vote c oncurred in an Ass embly r e s olu­
tion which invited the G eneral to addr e s s  a j o int session of the 
legislature . The predominatly Democratic Florida House of Re­
pres entatives defeated , overwhelmingly, a r e s olution introduc ed 
by the Republican minority ,  prais ing G eneral MacArthur . The 
leader of the Demo cratic opposition was Repres entative Francis 
Williams , an Air Force serg eant on leave to serve in hi s elected 
capacity .  Will iams said that if h e  had done what MacArthur did 
he ( Williams ) c ould have been courtmartialed . He felt that the 
Republicans were backing MacArthur in an e ffort to g et themselves 
a successful pr esidential candidate . In other state capitals 
around the nation legislative reaction wa s equally emoti onal , 
with the Pre sident ' s  action being prais ed and damned . 
Foreign Reaction 
Among the mo st enthusiastic ba ckers of Pre s ident Truinan ' s  
recall of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur were the nations 
of Europe , e specially those allies with troops in Korea . Although 
s ome of the men on the street , . when interviewed , agreed with the 
Duke of Marlboroug h ,  who in reply to reporter s ' questions replied 
that it had been done in a rather uncermoni ous fashi on , the g eneral 
feeling wa s one o f  approval o f  the President ' s  action . The first 
reacti on abroad on hearing o f the recall was one of surprise , sur­
pri s e  that Pre sident Truman had dared to take such a cti on a;;; ainst 
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a man of 11;acArthur • s popul arity with both members of Con2;r e s s  and 
the publi c .  1 
'rhere had been a feeling of apprehension in Ii::urope whiJ. e 
>iac.Arthur had been in a position where he could eas ily start the 
Third World War . The French did not seem to be s o  worried about 
whiit MacArthur might do as had b e en the .Britis h .  The g eneral 
feeling , however , was tl:lat the Eac.Arthur recall might have saved 
the United States from c ompl ete diplomatic is olation , as well as 
keeping the United States out of s ome s erious military di fficulties . 
l'here was a feeling that the recall meant l e s s  chance o f  total war 
in Europe ; and it wa s acknowledg ed as a s ign that President Truman 
had g iven priority to the de fen s e  of Europe . 2 
The British , on the other hand , gave a great s igh of relief 
upon hearing the news of the recall . They felt that MacArthur had 
b een responsible for much of the anti-British feeling in the United 
State s ,  and for much o f  the difficulty that plagued the Anglo-
American partner ship in Korea . To the British , Ma cArthur had 
appeared an arrogant proc ounsul that was flalLnting Ame�ican and 
United Nati ons policy . He appeared to be flirting with the idea 
of using Chinese Nati onalist troops in an effort to extend the war 
in Korea and even t o  China proper , in direct oppositi on to the 
announced policy of the United States and the United Nati ons , 
which was t o  not extend the war , but to keep it confined to the 
K . l 3 _orean peninsu a .  
1New York Time s , April 15 , 1951 , IV , p .  5. 
2Ibid . 
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The only Briti sh j ournal of larg e circulation to take is sue 
1dth Truman ' s  action wa s the c on s ervative Beaverbrook Dail;z �­
pre s s- - " I s  he [!Ieneral Ridg ewayJ al so to be t old by the Lake 
Suc c e s s lollipops that he can do anything he likes to the Chinese 
except hurt them? • • • It is like asking Joe Louis t o  go into the 
ring with a pair of handcuffs on . "  1 
The United Nation s  registered mainly praise and approval of 
Pre s ident Truman ' s  action . There the recall wa s seen as improving 
chances for peace ,  and as a p o s itive step in the dir ection of g a in­
ing support for the United States pol icy on Kor ea and s olidifying 
the United N ations stand on the Korean War . '!'here were tho se who 
began hoping again that perhaps Red China would now b e  willing 
to negotiate on peace talks and an armistice . All foreign re­
action to the recall ,  however , was not jubilation . There were 
expressions of s orrow from Japan and the Philippine Islands , where 
r·iacArthur wa s held in, high esteem. 
With the r eturn of General MacArthur to the United State s 
the tone o f  the Eur opean nations turned t o  that of bafflement , 
when instead of c oming home to the United States in disgrace as an 
insub ordinate Army officer that had b een dismissed by his g overn­
ment , he received a her o • s welcome . ·rhe jub ilation with which 
he wa s received wherever he went cau s ed a dwindling of any hopes 
for an early fade out of MacArthur and his idea s . They were , in­
stead , replaced with a fear that the pre s sure of �lacArthur and h i s  
public popularity might result in a chang e of the United States 
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policy o f  cooperation with the United N ations and the adoption of 
a unilateral policy along the lin e s  advocated by the HacArthur 
faction in the g overnment . 1 
Pre s s  Reaction 
Probably one of the calrne st groups in the United States on 
the subj e ct of the Ea cArthur dismissal was the pre s s  corps . Sur-
prisingly enou g h ,  even many repre sentatives of the pre s s  usually 
critical of the Pre sident stood behind his action . Of N ew York 
City ' s six daily newspaper s ,  four , the Daily N ews , the Mirror , the 
J ournal-A:nerican ,  and the World Telegram and Sun took General :Mac­
Arthur ' s  s ide in the c ontroversy . The l14ew York Times and the 
Herald Tribune , on the other hand rushed to the defens e  of the 
Pre s ident . 2 
Working tog ether , the lfow York 'fi.>nes , the As s o ciated Pre s s , 
and the United Pre s s  published a s erie s of exc erpts from editorial 
c omment throughout the c ountry , regarding the re call of General 
HacArthur . 3 The New York Herald ·rribune stated that MacArthur had 
virtually for c ed his mm removal . There was no r o om for a divided 
c o:mmand in ma tters of hig h policy .  A dangerous problem had been 
met in the only way po s s ibl e .  The N ew York Da:i.ly l'i"ews said that 
the entire Korean War situati on s tunk t o  heaven and that MacArthur 
was the man best suited to inform the public ab out what was wrong 
in Korea . It was another o f  MacArthur ' s  du ties , one of many in a 
lifetime of l oyal s ervi c e , to tell the .Americ an public what needed 
t o  b e  done . The New York Compa s s  spoke of the c ourage President 
_, _ _ _  ._, _______ ----- ------
1Ibid . 
2 Chic ag o  Tribune , April 15 , 1951 , p .  21+ . 
3rrhe New York Time s , April 1 2 ,  1s;51 , p .  7 .  
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Truman displayed in his long overdue removal o f  General MacArthur , 
thus ending his various attempts to s ab otag e  the Admini strati ons 
:moves toward peace in Asia . 'fhe N ewark Evening N ews said that the 
full implication s  of MacArthur ' s  position were not realized by 
those who were looking at him through the "gleaming veil of laud­
able s entiment . "  There c ould not be two captains on the ship , and 
the Pre sident a s  Commander in Chief was right to act . The Loui s­
ville Kentucky Courier-Journal remarked that a strong er Pre sident 
would have removed MacArthur earlier , when it b e came cl ear that h e  
would not limit himsel f to hi s !llilitary j ob . The only alternative 
to Truman ' s  action would have been to surrender the power of the 
Pre s idency to a field commander . The Pittsburg Post Gazette saw 
MacArthur , throug h repeated insub ordination , as forcing the i s sue . 
It c ontinued , even thos e  who felt that MacArthur ' s  policy for the 
Far East was right should be able to see that he could not be allow­
ed to g o  off in one direction while the administration moved in 
another . The Chi cag o Sun Times a s s erted that no g eneral was bigger 
than the United States g overnment or his Commander in Chief . It 
felt that MacArthur would g et a hero ' s  wel come which he des erved , 
but that was a great deal di fferent than following him on a c ours e  
that would l ead ine s capably t o  the Third World War . The St . Louis 
Post-Dispatch felt that the President made a choice which wa s b oth 
rig ht and di fficult . It wa s what l1acArthur would have done to any 
subordinate offic er who had made a pra cti ce of ignoring military 
order s from higher authority .  It c ontinued , the only differenc e  
was that General MacArthur would have done i t  after the first breach ,  
he would not have waited to be goaded t o  act . In Seattle , the Times 
JJ 
called for the public to exercise calm and reasonable judgement 
and above all to rem.ember that Harry Truman was President of the 
United States ,  not Douglas MacArthur. 
Although the :majority of the journalists and publishers tend­
ed to support President Truman, General MacArthur had his support 
in the press . David Lawrence or the tJ,S, News and World Report was 
inclined toward General MacArthur ' s  position. Lawrence in one ot 
his editorials referred to Mac.Arthur as a symbol of hope that came 
out or the clouds of frustration and despair . He called the public 
receptions that MacArthur received a sign that the .American public 
rejected an •unmoral [sic] and weak-kneed Administration that 
preaches defeatism. even as it seeks by innuendoes and smears to 
persuade the American People • • •  it • • •  is just a disobedience of 
' orders ' . " 1 � magazine , in one of its editorials supporting 
MacArthur, spoke or him as a man that understood the global in­
terest of the United States and und�stood Asia and was higbJ3' 
respected there . It called MacArthw- a man who was free to speak 
out and cut through the poisonous politics , t.he meanness and small­
ness of the last few months . 2 
One of the most vociferous supporters of General MacArthur 
was the Chicago Tribune. The day after the announcement of General 
MacArthur ' s recall , the Tribune carried a front page editorial 
severely criticizing President Truman. The editorial was simply 
entitled "Impeach Truman" , and it read: 
lDavid Lawrence ,  "Inviting World War III? " ,  U . S .  News and World 
Report , llX (April 20 , 1951) ,  P •  76• 
2•Tbe Role of MacArthur" , Life , J\.pril 2J , 1951, p. 42. 
President Truman must be impeached and convicted . 
Bis hasty and vindictive removal or Gen . Mac.Arthur is 
the culmination of a series of acts which have shown 
that he is unfit , morally and mentally, for his high 
office . 
Mr .  Truman can be impeached for usurping the power 
of congress when he ordered American troops to the Kor­
ean front without a declaration of war . He can be im­
peached , also , for surrounding himself with grafters and 
incompetents . or the grafters alone , there is a veri­
fied list as long as your arm. 
Rep . Martin , spea:ldng for Republican leaders in 
congress who conferred on the MacArthur dismissal , 
said that impeachments were discussed. He emphasized 
the plural . Mr. Truman ' s  mean and nall mind is under 
the domination of more sinister ones .  Bis latest 
action is a victory for the Lattimores and Services , 
for Acheson , the friend and defender of the traitor , 
Hiss ,  and the British socialists , eager to sacrifice 
every principle to save their Hong Kong trade . 
Every day that Mr .  Truman remains in office 
menaces the safety of the United States and the lives 
of millions of its sons . The Democrats must put 
country above party . 
Mr .  Truman obviously acted with little more 
forethought than when he addressed a music critic 
in gutter language .  Personal spite moved him. He is 
spiteful because Gen . MacArthur ' s  recent statements 
have made it clear to the nation Truman ' s  own folly 
and the moral bankruptcy of the United Nations . 
Gen. MacArthur was fired because he said force­
tully what the people of the United States are think­
ing .  The nation is appalled . Not only will it SUP­
port impeachment ; it will demand it. 
Except that they have been deprived of the leader­
ship ot the greatest soldier of this generation, the 
situation is not changed for the privates in the mud 
ot Korea. Their officers are still tied by the direc­
tive of March 20, which Mr. Truman has now disclosed, 
forbidding advances in force beyond the )8th parallel . 
Stalin and his Chinese agents are given official assur­
ance that they have sanctuary in North Korea from which 
to launch further attacks , while Mr. Truman ' s  leaders 
tr;y to scare congress into dratting more men and send­
ing more troops to Europe . 
The stage is now set to sell out to the Communists . 
Foreign Minister .Morrison ot Great Britain greeted the 
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news of Gen . Ne e.Arthur ' s  dismi s sal with the statement that 
the way is now open for dis cu s sing a c e a s e- fire in Korea . 
The bribe is  reBdy .  Hi s g overnment announced officially 
that it favors the " eventual11 return of Formosa to Red 
China . Anything to save the Hong Kong trade . 
The A-merican nati on has never been iri greater dan­
ger . It i s  l ed by a fool who is surrounded by knave s .  
Impeachment i s  the only remedy . 1 
J ohn Cowles , pres ident of the Ninneaoolis Star and 'I'ribune , 
speaking at the Un iversity of His s ouri a sked the que stion ,  11Would 
not qualified psychol og ists , regardl e s s  of their political vi ews 
say that what we have been witnessing in the United State s  in the 
last c ouple of weeks is what t ook place in Germany and Italy not 
too l ong ago for s ome of us to remember? 11 2 
The July 14 ,  1951 , issue of the Saturday Review of Literature 
c arried a survey of the reaction of news c orrespondent s to the 
JY:acArthur dismis sal . 3 Acc ording to the survey the correspondents ,  
by more than six t o  one , believed that '£ruman was right in reliev-
ing lliacArthur of his c orn.11ands . One of the r eporters said that 
Pre sident Truman was abs olutely justifi ed in removing MacArthur 
and that MacArthur had been writing his own foreign pol icy with 
almost trea s onous di sreg ard for the administration pol icy and hi s 
CorrJ.nander in Chief.  Several other report er s said that they had 
begun to que stion MacArthur ' s  c omp etence in hi s handling of the 
lchicago Tribune , April 12 , 1951 , p . 1 . 
2New York Time s , Nay 5 ,  1951 , p .  9 .  
3Elmo Roper and Louis Harr i s , wrhe Pre s s  and the Great Debate " ,  
Saturday Review of Literature , XXXIV ( July 14 , 1951 ) , pp . 6-9 , 29-31 . 
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war ; that his ability a s  a c omrr.ander had b e c ome questionabl e .  1 
� c orrespondent John Dominis , writing from Korea , sum ed up 
this feeling when he said : 
Truman wa s right not only becaus e of MacArthur ' s  differ­
ences  of opinions vD.th the J oint Chiefs but because of 
his Yalu River mistake , his aloofnes s  with the troops , 
which failed to inspire them , and his compl ete non- con­
c ern over the moral of his troops . His one man show in­
spired few in hi s c ommand . 2 
Many of the Washing t on correspondents not only agre ed with 
the re call , but felt that Truman should have acted earlier in re-
calling MacArthur . MacArthur , they felt , had been creating a 
s erious divis i on among allied power s and there fore had to g o ; 
but most reporters felt that Truman c ould have chosen a more tact-
ful way of r emoving MacArthur . 
Several of the reporters expres s ed the view that }IacArthur 
had not been ent irely honest in his public s tatements . An other 
s aid that MacArthur had c ome danger ously close to deliberate de-
c aption in pre senting his ca s e  to the American people before Con-
grass and the Committee . 
The vast maj ority of the pre s s  urg ed a calm , del ib erate con-
s ideration of the fact s of the matter , and i s sued a plea to avoid 
the oveNm.otione.1 fever of the moment . 
Public Reaction 
The reaction of the pre s s  and Congress were minor in c ompari-
s on to the storm once the news of the G eneral ' s  recall reached . the 
public . There have been few political events in American his tory 
1Ibid . , P • 7 • 
2Ibid . , PP • 6-7 . 
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which have caus ed as explosive or as extens ive a public reaction 
as did the recall of Gene ral ll:ac.Arthur . J, minority of the people 
irm::iediately supported Pre sident Truman ' s  action , but by far the 
large ma.j ori ty of the pop1 1l ati on thought '£rum.an • s recall of l:•fa c-
Arthur showed signs of "insolence , j ealousy , vindictiveness , and 
id d . t · 1 · " 1 some even cons ere i a sacri ige . 
The White Bouse and members of Congress were almo st immediate-
ly swamped with the deluge of telegrams and telephone calls that 
bega.n to pour in shortly after the publi c learned of the recall . 
Senator Richard Nixon of California g ot more than s ix hundred tele-
grams on the first day , most o f  whi ch were in favor of impeachment 
of Truman . In less than twenty-four hours the White House al one 
�ad received 1700 telegra.�s , running three to one against the re-
call . \mile the most immediate public reaction was opposed to the 
President ' s  action ,  on April 16 , the White House announc ed that the 
trend of the mail had changed and now the letters ran only three to 
t . t T 2 wo agains ruman . The �fuite House then announced on April 25 , 
that the President was ga.ining in support and the mail was then 
fifty-two per c ent if! favor o f  the General and forty- eight per cent 
in favor of the President . J 
The first public re sponse as had been expected , was sharply 
1Phillips ,  p .  )44 . 
2
11MacArthur Homecoming" , l''acts on File , April lJ-19 , 19 51 , p .  122 . 
3"1"'.:.acArthur-China Controver sy'' , Facts on Fil e ,  April 20-26 , 
1951 , p .  129 . 
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divided and highly emotional . 1 'rhe reaction of the :man on the 
street , unlike his repre s entative on Capitol Hill did not follow 
s trictly along p arty line s . A New York 'fime s survey indicated 
that in the N orth east the first wave of emotion was strongly favor­
abl e to the General and highly critical of the Pre s ident . The 
Middle West like the N ortheast generally supported the General . 
In Omaha twenty-three out of twenty- five pers ons interviewed on 
the street supported .!VJ.B. cArthur . In Chic ag o ,  while the feel ing did 
not run quite so strongly , the public temper did run slightly in 
favor of Ma cArthur . The Southern portion o f  the c ountry s eemed 
to be more favorable to Truman . A sample of public opini on in 
Richmond , Virginia , showed the margin of public support for the 
President was ab out two to one . The Pacific c o a st which is more 
s ensitive to As ian policy reg i stered fe eling s of shock and regret 
at loo s ing such a g r eat military c ommander . 
Various demonstrations of support for the General oc curred 
around the c ountry . In San Gabriel , California ,  among other place s ,  
a group of college students hung Truman in effigy from a flag pole . 
At Little Rock , Arkan s a s , MacArthur ' s  birthplace , the flag wa s 
l owered to half-ma st when the news wa s rec eived . 
Telegrams were the order of the day . A minister in Houston , 
Texas , started dictating a telegram on the telephone , he g ot as 
far as " Your removal of General .MacArthur is a great victory for 
J o s eph Stal in • • • " and then he dropped dead . One rather emotional 
lady in Charlestown ,  Maryland , s tarted to send a telegram calling 
lNew York Times , April 15 , 1951 , IV, p .  5 .  
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Truman a "rnoron" , but she was cens ored by Western Union--finally 
she and the c ompany settled on using the word "wilting " .  1 
One Los Angel es newsman doing on the street intervi ews was 
turned into a straight man during one of hi s intervi ews . The man 
being interviewed commented he was going out for a Truman beer . 
The announ cer quarried "What kind of beer i s  that? " ·rhe man re­
plied , ''Ju st like any other b e er-- except it hasn • t  g ot a head . "  
In Los Angele s a man and his wi fe g o t  into an argument over 
the Me.cArthur rec all and ended with the man hitting his wife over 
the head with a radio . A group of Chi cag o mothers whose sons had 
been fighting in Korea , under MacArthur , paraded ar ound with open 
umbrellas on whi ch they had printed "Impeach Truman" and "Our boys 
in Korea need Ma.cArthur . "  In Atlanta , Georgia , a former s oldier 
g ot so mad that he t ook a Bronze Star which he had rec eived from 
Truman , wrapped it up in the citation and mailed it t o  the White 
Hous e . 
Another indignant man , sixty-five year old Hal sey McGovern , 
refused to accept the Medal of Honor bestowed on one of his two 
s on s  that h13.d died in Korea , on the grounds that Truman was un­
worthy to bestow it . 
When MacArthur ' s  plane , the Bataan , touched down in San Fran­
c isco on Tuesday , April 17 , he received a tremendou s greeting a s  
h e  sat foot o n  h i s  native s oil for the first time sinc e 1937 . 
Speaking at the airport he said , "The only polit i c s  I have is 
111Tattoo for a Warrior" , 1lli,, April 23 , 1951 , p.  36 . 
2�. 
3!!?1s!. , p .  37 
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c ontained in the si!11pl e phrase known W!!,ll by all of you : God bless 
A - • · 1  1 ."1.meric a ' . 
Thurs day morning at a few minutes after midnight the JfacArthur 
party reached Wa shing t on and twelve thousand hysterical well wishers 
at Na.tional Airport broke through p olice lines and made a shamble s  
o f  the offi cial wel c ome . 
N ew York City , whi ch is  famous for the gre eting s it gives publ ic 
officials and heroes , out did its el f  in welcoming MacArthur home . 
The reception it ac corded was greater than that given Lindb erg or 
Eisenhower , it wa s even larger than the one on V-J Day . Torn paper 
fell until s ome of the streets were ankle deep , on s ome part s of the 
parade route the paper was c oming down so heavily that television 
cameras taking pictures of the parade c ould on occasion g et picture s  
of not:1ing but white blurs . As }'l...acArthur • s  limousine pa s s ed s everal 
men and women were s e en to cros s themselves . 2 
An anonymous Southern Senator commented "The people in my 
part of the c ountry ar e almost hyster ical , but there is nothing 
whats o ever to do in this instance but to stand with Truman . It is 
s imply a question o f  whether civil g overnment is to be m.aintained . '.3 
The American Legion went on record a s  being opposed to the 
recall of MacArthur . They said it was terrible to put a man in the 
posi tion where he was re spon s ible for men ' s  live s , tie hi s hands , 
and then fi!'e him for c omplaining . Other veteran groups , however , 
did expres s  support for the President ' s  actions . The Amvets and 
the A.�erican Veterans Committee supported Truman becaus e they felt 
1Phillips ,  p .  347 .  
2 Goldman , p .  205 . 
3Rees , p .  223 . 
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that ha c.Arthur h<.J d di splayed re3::'eated insub ordin;1tion in violating 
the basic American principles  g overning civil -military relations . 1 
Not even the churches wer e  immune t o  the raging c ontroversy. 
The Vatican paper l ' O s s ervat ore Romano said that Pre s id ent ·rruman ' s 
action showed a d e s ire for peac e . 
The letters to  the editor s e ction of most newspapers wa s re-
c eiving all the mail they could possibly hand] e ,  and then s ome • 
.Some readers wrote heated c»nunciations of one side or the other 
of the is sue , others sent '1ore clearly thou;;ht ont cormnents on the 
probl em. . Cne re ader wrote , "Sure G eneral I'facArthur spoke out of 
turn and thank God he did : If you were facing the enemy with your 
hands tied behind your back you , too , would speak out . 11 2 A.l!other 
reader C OJTL"1ented that the :a1ost urgent need of the United States wa s 
for two ex-Presidents .  One wrote : 
I imagine that General MacArthur had Mao pretty worried 
until our State Departm�nt made it clear that he had 
nothing to worry about . \'./hat next? It is surpris ing 
that no one ha s sug ,"'. ested the abolishment to the State 
Department . Its function could be better admini strated 
by the Army or the Boy Scouts or by me . 3 
Not all of the l etters were opposed to the Administrat ion 
and its pol i ci e s . A Chicag o l a.dy wrote that :MacArthur had b e en 
tied up with the Pacific for s o. l one; that he was no l ong e r  abl e 
t o  evallrnte the world wide problems of today . One letter r e ff'!rred 
to HacArthur as a "would-be A.inerican Hitler" and his de sire to 
plung e the United Stat e s  into a n  atom b omb war . 
By late Iv'iay 1951 , the letters to the editor began to chang e 
lN ew York Time s , April 12 , 1951 , p .  5. 
2chi c ago Tribune , April 14 , 1951 , p .  8 .  
3�. April 23 , 1951 , p .  6 .  
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in their empha s i s . Gradually at firs t  and then in increasin; 
nurnbers the r'�aders began to point out that s everal of the Re­
publican s who were attacking the Administration were g ettin�; on 
pretty shaky ground in s ome of their charg es . After the Sen ate 
hearin� s the empha s i s  o f  the l etters on the Far Ea.st s e emed to 
be primarily c oncerned with bringing the war to a conclusion • .. 
Thr oughout the hue and cry for his s calp , Pres ident Truman 
remained calm .  R e  c on fided to fr iendly report ers that h e  had ex­
pected the immeiioi te re action to the recall t o  be both l oud and 
favorab1e to MacArthur . But he fel t that slowly , as the facts 
came to lic;ht , the public would come to real i z e  that he wa s only 
strivins to pre s erve peac e .  
Just a s  though he were o n  trial in a c ourt o f  law, 'fruman 
plnY1ned for the defen s e  of his foreign policy in the c ourt o f  
public opini on . 'l'he stage on which h e  would present his case 
was the S enate hearing s ,  and hi s main witn e s s e s  were to be the 
J oint Chie fs of Staff . In their te stimony , the s ervice chi efs 
hammered on two Plain points . They said that !viacArthur , by his 
actions wa s chall enging the c o n c ept of c ivilian c ontrol of the 
military , and that s ome of the moves he wa s advocatin g were 
"trag ically wr ong . "  fhey empha.si  zed that in their opinion Ms.c­
Arthur ' s program would involve the United States in a full s cale 
war with Red China ( and pos s ibly the Soviet Union) . A war which 
they felt the United Stat e s  could not afford to enter . 
lfacArthur S peaks to Congre s s  
Shortly after his return to the United States , hacArthur began 
a crusade , a crusad� aimed at stirring th e A..>n.eri can people t o  action 
to right national wrong s .  He saw the dang ers menac ing the land and 
the people he l oved and felt that not to speak , not to warn them 
would be a betrayal of their belief in him . 1 
'l'he first step in MacArthur ' s  crusade , even thoug h he did not 
des cribe it as a crusade at this time , was his addre s s  to Congress . 
With due pomp and ceremony lfacArthur ent er ed the Hou s e  chambers 
as th e House Doorkeeper annou..11ced ,  "Nr . Speaker , General of the 
2 Army Douglas 1-ia cArthur . " To the applause of  the memb ers of Con-
gre s s  and tho s e  pre s ent in the galleries ?IacArthur ent�Jred the 
chamber and took his place before the microphones . Arthur , the 
General ' s  young s on and a l ine of offic ers who had served with 
MacArthur sat in a row of chair s normally res erved for the Cabin et 
during a joint s e s s ion , but ther e were no Cabinet memb er s  pre s ent 
at this ses sion .  At first glance ,  it appeared more a s  i f  therr� 
were to be an addr e s s  by a chief' of state of a foreign nation rather 
than a relieved Arrrry offi c e r .  "Mr . Pre sident , Mr. Spe aker , di s-
tinguished Members o f  Congr ess • • •  ! address you • • • with but one pur­
pose in mind , to s erve rrrJ country . tt 3 As he spoke MacArthur pro-
,j ect�d a powerful imag e , a man in complete control of the situation . 
His bearing wa s digni fi ed and upright , his delivery wa s stern and 
unhurried , the urg ency of the mes sage c ombined with his use of the 
dramatic pau s e  produ c ed a spe ech which had a great effe ct on those 
who heard it . 4 In his address he attacked the Ad.ministration ' s  
lwhitne;r ,  p .  490 . 
2� . c t 215 . 0pan1er , on r oversy , p .  
3�. 
4Ibid . ' p .  216 . 
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pol icy as appeasement by tho s e  who were blind to the l e s sons of 
history .  He reiterated his support for the Chiang g overnment . He 
said that the intervention of the Communist Chinese into the Korean 
War made it an entirely new war . New pol itical decisions which were 
needed for the adoption of a realistic mil itary policy were not 
forthc oming . He reiterated hi s four basic  proposals whose adopti on , 
he s a id ,  would win the war in Korea for the United State s . MacArthur 
closed his addr e s s  with what s ome cynics called c orn , but whatever 
it was called it made an impression on his audienc e ,  
I am closing my 52 year s o f  military servic e .  When 
I j oined the Army , even before the turn of the century , 
it wa s the fulfillment of all my b oyish hopes and dreams . 
'rhe world has turn ed over many times since I took tho 
oath on the Plain at We st Point , and the hopes and dreams 
have l ong since vanished . But I still remember the re­
frain of on e of the most popular barrack ballads of that 
day , which proclaimed , mos t  proudly , that "Old s oldi ers 
never die . They just fade away. " 
And like the old s oldi er of that ballad , I now close 
my military career and just fade away--an old soldier who 
tried to do his duty as God gave him the light t o  see that 
duty. G oodbye . 1 
As MacArthur finished his speech he handed hi s manus cript to 
the House Cl �rk , waved t o  his wife sitting in the g aller i e s  and 
walked toward the exit . 'rhe applause following his spe ech was 
thunder ous . s�veral Congres smen had tears in their eye s , others 
wer e  even more emotional . YiacArthur • s  wa s a well polished and well 
practiced speec h , and it achieved thft des ired effect . Representa.-
tive Dewey Short later said in the House , "We heard God speak here 
today , God in the flesh,  the voi c e  of G od • • •  " Herb ert Hoover re-
fraining from g oing quite that far saw MacArthur as a. "reincarnat ion 
1 Whan , p .  252 . 
of St . Paul int o a great General of the Army who c rune out of the 
East . r t  One of the Senators who was supporting the administrati on 
said "this is a new experience ; I have never feared more for the 
institutions of the country. I honestly felt that if the speech 
had g one on much longer there might have been a march on t--he White 
House . "  1 
Millions o f  people who had s een the speech on television or 
who had listened on radio turned off their s ets in a state of high 
emotion . The public h:a.d been aroused to fever pitch onc e  again by 
tho spe ech. 
Although the spe e ch wa s hailed as a masterpiece , it really 
didn ' t  chang e anyon9 � mind . It only made those who were already 
supporting MacArthur sure that they were right as it did with tho se 
supporting the Administration .  
After his address to  Congr es s , MacArthur did n o t  fade away . 
In fact it would not have been in character for MacArthur to have 
' 
done so . Foll owing his te stimony to the Senate committee ,  he b egan 
a nationwide crus ade "to revitali ze the nation and save the fre edom 
of repr e s enta.tive g overnment in America" or a "vendetta" wa s the 
name given to it in Democratic circle s . 2 
Speaking to the Texa s Legislatur� , June 13 , 1951 , Y.LB.cArthur 
\ 
spoke of the moral decay in, the United States .  
I have been amazed ,  and de eply conc erned , s ince my 
return , t o  obs erve the extent to which the orientation 
of our nati o:Qal policy tends to depart from the tradition­
al c ourag e ,  vision and forthrightne s s  whi ch has anirnated 
lRees , p .  227 . 
2Goldman , p .  206 . 
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and guided our ;:;rea.t l�iaders of  th e I.J'ist , to be now 
largely in fJ.l1 e '1ced , i f  not ind ec•d in s ome instances 
dictat ed , from abroad and dorninated by fear o f  what 
others may think or others may d o .  N ever bl!Llf ore in 
our hi story can pr�cedent bet found for such a sub­
ordination of policy to the opinions of others with 
a mini.111um regard for th e dir ecti on of our own nation­
al interest . N ever b e fore have we geared na.tional 
policy to timidity and fear . The guide , instead , 
has invariably b e em one of high moral principle and 
the c ourage to decide great issufll s on the spiritu.a1 
hvel o f  what is right and what i s  wrong . Yet , in 
Korea today , we have reached that degree of moral 
trepidation that we pay tribute in the blood of our 
s ons t o  the doubtful b elief that the hand of a blus­
tering potential enemy may be .some way be thus s tayed . · 
Munich , .and rnany other historical examples , have 
taught us that diplomatic appeas ement but s ews the 
s e eds of future conflj_ct . Y�t , oblivious to the s e  
bloody 10s s ons , we now practic e a new and Y<�t more 
dang er ous form of a.ppeas ement--appf.llasement on the 
battl e field whereunder we soften cur blows , with-
hold our power , and surrender military advantages , 
in appaN1nt hope th�:ct in s ome nebulous way by so 
doing a potential enemy will be c oerced to desist 
from atta cking us . 1 
Before the Mas sachusetts Legislatur e , l'lacArthur warned : 
insidious forces working from within which have al­
ready so dr01.stica.lly alt�red the chara cter of our 
fre e  institutions- -thos e  institutions which former-
ly we hailed as s omething beyond que stion or challenge-­
thos e in stitution s  we proudly called the A..'Tierican way 
of li fe .  2 
]e al so voiced deep c onc ern about : 
a new and heretofore unknown and da.ng erous c onc ept 
that the members of our armed forc e s owe primary 
all eg iance and loyalty to thos 111 who t emporarily ex­
ercise the authority of the exE?cu tive bran ch of 
G overnment , r!<.th8r than to th� c o1mtry and its Con­
stitut i on which they are sworn to defend . 3 
lvfuan , pp . 26J-64 . 
2Douglas MacArthur ,  "As HacArthur Se"s  th"' I s su e s--Resistance 
to Cormrmnism, to Exce s siv" Taxation , Bureaucratic GoverrurHmt and 
Corruption , 11 iJ . S .  l1I ews and World R�port , Aus;ust J ,  1951 , p .  55 . 
3!1?1£. p .  56 . 
Ht1: said th.2 t the a::hnini s  trations policy of r�ckl !" s s  sp�nd in[ ,-.ncl. 
ov�rtaxation was stifling the Am.erician spiri t .  1 
In a spe e ch d'!'livored to th!!> American Legion National Convention 
Stat � s  r e s ourc e s  in Korea and o f  not really wanting to  win th<:>, war 
th�re . H� said : 
De spite s ome publ i c  statements to the contrary , th�re 
is rf!?a s on to fear that it is still the overriding purpose 
of s ome of our political leaders , under the influr'm ce of 
allie s  who maintain diplomatic ties with CommtL.'1.ist China , 
to yield the i sland o f  Formosa at an opportun @ time to 
th� Chin e s e  henchrnem o f  international Cormnunism • 
• • • • • • 
There i s  littl 2 doubt that the yielding of Formosa. 
and the s c ,ei.tiT1g o f  Communist China in the Unit�:id N a.tions 
was fully planned Fhen I called upon the enemy c om ... '1w.nder 
in Korea on Harch 24 to meet me in the field to arrange 
arm.istice terms . This I did in view of the fundamental 
weakne s s  of his military position du® to the lack of an 
industri al base in China capable of sunportin!"' modern 2 . .. � warfaro . 
He condemn!'ld the Admini stration for l t%lding the nation doi.-m t� cc 
roci d to s ociaJ.isr1 an-l t•c onomic disas ter . He called for a strong er 
Dni ted St::ttss  committment in Korea to support the America.n troops 
there and an end to th('!) usl'll e s s  slaughter . 3 
It. wa s in Seattle , Wa shington ,  on November 13 , 1951 , tba.t 
N.acArthur deliv�red his sharpest attack t o  dato on the Truman 
Ad·ninistration . He called upon Americans to chang e tho nationa.l 
l eriador ship . He accus ed the Adi.'11inistration o f blundl'.lring t oward 
a third world war ,a.nd of c ontributing to the building up of Soviet 
military strength and for the victory of the Corr1.nu.�ist s in China . 
1 
11219.· ' p .  55 . 
2nMacArthur ' s Program for U . S .  , 11 U . S .  ]'J 0ws and World Rlimort , 
Octob�r 26 , 1951 . 
3Ibid . ' p .  85 . 
1+8 
He ag ain rep�A.ted his charge that thf'l Adrr.inistra.tion 1 ra s  allowing 
the country to drift toward s ocial ism and was pursuing a ruinous 
s_pimding and taxing policy .  Hany Democrats in the audien ce con s ider-
Ad th• speech s o  strong and s o  partis an that they g ot up and walked 
out when MacArthur was only mid-way in his speech . Sfllveral o f  therm 
even refus ed to s how up at a ceremony wel c oming a shipload of Kor-
ean veteran s home at which MacArthur was to be pres ent . The n ext 
evening at a dinner wh8n asked to speak he replied that his wi fe had 
t old him h• had talked enough in S@attle . 1 
Throughout hi s speaking t our MacArthur implied that the Briti sh 
and s ome of our " s o  called" all i e s  wer e  responsible for this recall 
and that it wa s pa.rt of a gl obal plot . 2 He said that there were n o 
reasons for hi s dismi s s al and that in retrospect , it must s e em that 
all of thlll Administrations "rea son s" masked s omething deeper . 
As time pa s s ed HacArthur broadened the basis  of hi s oppositi on 
to the Admini s trat i on . .He moved from his attack on Far Eastern 
policy to attacking thn whole. of American for eign and dome stic 
policy . The emphasis of  l{a cArthur ' s  chalhmg e had chang ed , what had 
originally been the key i s sue--whether the Communist threat was 
to  b e  c ount ered principally in Europe or in Asia--had become an 
i s sue of minor importanc e .  3 
-----· -·-
111The General in S e a.ttlG " ,  .l1!!!• N ovemb er 26 ,  1951 ,  pp . 24-2,5 . 
2Richard Rovere , The American Establishm@nt and Oth er Re ort s ,  
Opinion s , and Soecul;i.tions N ew York : Har c ourt , Bract1 ,  & World , Inc . , 
1962) . p .  231 . 
3Richard Rovere and Arthur S chle s ing er , Jr . , The ViacArthur 
Controvers and A11u11ri can Foroi n Polic ( New York : Farrar , Straus , 
and Giroux ,  19 5 , pp . 220-21 . 
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1'he nor !1> HacArthur t:;;.lked �.b" mor!!'> he s otmd ed like a candidate for 
.. , bl . f'" ' 1 p J 1C o.,_ L ic e . 
Courtney 1rta:L t:'.cey des crioing MacArthur ' s  crusade said thg_t  th., 
lie;ht in th� �ye s  and the f •v�rent expr e s s i on of friendship W©re 
identi cal in California , K ew York , Te:xas , Mas s a chus etts , and 1.1'.is s-
i s s ippi .  " It was one gr eat pow�rful mani fest�tion o f  the Amt!!!rj_can 
public ' s  b elief that H?.cArthur had bHn brutally wronged by th«" 
manner o f  his dismi s s al ,  th;;i.t h�� des @rved the gre�test hero ' s wel-
c ome of all , that--to put it bluntly--1'.i:acArthur was right and 
2 'l'rurn.an wrong . "  
Cn his tours of th� Uni t8d States JVia.cArthur appt!1a r0d. in city 
a ft-er city posing with his wi fe and s on ,  exempli fying what he c.all.�d 
t1the simpl e ,  eternal truths of the Am0rican way . 11 EacArthur stood 
for wha t  Er ic Goldman s o  aptly h.bel ed an '*Older America . "  His 
spe!!!che s were loaded with sort of grandios\1\1 patriot i sm cnor.;3 typic<'.l.1 
of th� America of the e ;i.rly 1900 ' s .  Hi s spe�che:s were vaguely 
rlllmini s c ent of the era of William Jennings Bryan . 3 
MacArthur in M.s speeches spoke for an older Am(l)rica ,  an 
Am(l!rica. in which thin'.s s did not move quite so quickly . Like many 
other Am�rlcans , :EacArthur , who hfl.d beam away from th@ United States 
for fiftl!an ynar s ,  was frightened and c onfu s ed by the rapidly 
l" Eyl'ls on EacArthur11 , N ewswe ek , June 25 , 1951 , p .  17 . 
2Whitney , p .  282 . 
3Goldman , p .  207-08 . 
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chane;inr; Cnited States to whi c11 h<r1 a".d rctur1Bd . 1 'l'hi ;3 w;;i_ s not the 
kn�ric& that he r�memb �red . E�.cArthur had proved to b� out of touch 
with the changing face of the Un�ted St;i.te s , and even mar<" 'i_·«1port ant 
he was out of touch with the temperament of th e Am�rican people and 
their changed attitude . 
----- --- __ ,, __ - - - ·--- - - ----·-------
III SENATE HEARINGS 
Within a short time afte r Pre s ident Truman announced the recall 
of General Douglas Ma cArthur from his Far Eastern posts , tho Republi-
can members of Cong r e s s  began to demand a full- s cale investigation 
into the Administration ' s  Far �ei. stern policy .  After much discuss-
i on it was agreed that the ho �ring s would be conducted by the c om­
bined Senate Foreign Relations Committe e  and Armed Servic es  Com-
mitte e ,  with Senator Richard Rus s ell ( D-Ga . ) a cting as chairman . 
The c ommittee opened its investigation on May J ,  1951 . 
'hstimony of Gen�ral MacArthur 
The first witn e s s  to appear be fore the Senate committee was 
th\\\ former Far Ea stern Corrummder . At the op�ning of his t@ stimony 
MacArthur said t�at h� had no prepar©d stat®mont to mako . H• 
empha s ized that he was ;;i.ppearing "not a s  a voluntary witnes s  at 
all , but in re.spon se  to requ � s t  of the committee . "  1 
In his t e stimony th$ General accused the Truman Admini s tration 
of having no definite plan for Korea , except to continue the war 
lu . s .  Congre s s , Senate , Com..rnittee on Armed Servic es and Com ... . 
mittee on Foreign Relations , H9arings on the l".iilitary Situation in 
the Far East and the Facts Surroundin th• Relief of General Dou las 
in that Area 2nd Cong . , 1st Ses s . , ._""9r--._.--l'"""'!r----....,���"-��--c�i�t�e-d�a-s--=H�e-a rings . ) 
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without victory ;ind ;o.t a h<t! "' V°'J  cost in Ameri can liv�s .  He saj.d that 
th., war would be won if all the wr�ps W"lr e taken off th"' ;dr �nd s ei a.  
forces . By bombing the Chin E>i s e  supply ba s e s  in Manchurh . •md China , 
us ing a naval blockade to cut off inc oming supplilills ,  and maki;1 g u s e  
of t h e  Chinese N a tionalist forcies avail.Q.blo , th1� war could be turn ®d 
to favor th<!! linitfld N ;o.tions forc G s . 1 M.acArthur stat0d that so fa.r 
as he kn ew the pos ition of the J oint Chi e fs of Staff and his were 
practically identical . H8 supported as evidenc e a study that th@ 
Joint Chi8 fs pre s lf:lnted to the S ecretary o f  De1fens11 on January 12 , 
whi ch included hi s four points for action in Korea . H� s aid that 
so far as h·� lm�w the J oint Chi@fs had never changed their recom­
mendations . 2 Wh$n questioned further .ab out the Joint Chiefs ' 
supr.ort for h i s  polici e s  MacArthur · said tha.t he had r � c e iv"lld n o  
oth"lr infor�1�.tion from th!ll Chi e fs eith n c oll � ctively o r  individu'.l l-
ly .  While 1-racArthur admitted th at h e  had not r <":lc ei ved any 1'Vid"'1nce 
@ither in writing or or.ally of thf!l J oint Chiefs ' support he said 
that so far as he know they had never taken any pos ition which 
wa s in contr�di cti on to th11t po s ition of J anuary 12 . 3 
MacArthur said that h� knew of no military comm�nder in hi s t ory 
who had weapon s at his dispo sal whi ch would probably be decisive 
in causing a favorabli! end to a war who did not us t< t'1io•m. 4 
l"MacArthur Testimony , " Fact s on File , May 4-10 ,  1951 , p .  146 . 
2H.,.arings , P«.rt 1 ,  p .  1) . 
3.lli:£. ,  p .  48 . 
4 Ibid • •  p .  60 . 
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Under que stioning from Senators , wayne Mors e  and Ru s s ell Mc­
Mahon , the General stated that he beli eved that what the United 
Nations did in the war would not affect the que stion of S ovi et 
intervention . He said that if the Sovi et Uni on decided that she 
had more to gain by l etting c onditions remain as they were and 
decided not to attack the We st , then whatever the United Nations 
cho s e  to do in Asia would not c ause th• S oviet Union to chang e her 
mind . I f ,  how�ver ,  the Sovi�t Union felt that war with the Western 
p owers must c ome s o oner or later then what was done in Korea could 
caus e a shift in the Soviet timetable . 1 If this were to happen , 
however , it would be to the advantag e of the United 3tatlls s ince 
Rus sia would have to make her move before she was completely pre­
pared . 
MacArthur took another swipe at the Administration ' s  policy 
of limited war , calling it appeas ement . He said that a nation 
went to war wh$n all other political means had failed and that 
when men beca,me locked in b attl e , there should be no artifi c e  und�r 
the name o f  politics that handicaped your own men and decreased 
their chances of winning . 2 
T e stimony o f  Secretary of De fen s e  Marshall 
One point that the Secretary of Defense mad e  clear from the 
first of hi s te stimony was that the J oint Chie fs of Staff did not 
libid . , ' pp .  9 ,  67 , 75 . 
2
¥.:.illis , Arms and the Stat e , pp . 324-25 .  
agree with Ma cArthur .as lif;acArthur had cont•nded they did .  
From the very b eg inning o f  the Korean conflict down 
t o  the pres 9nt mom8nt , th�re has b e en no di sagr�•m�nt be­
twe en the President , the Se cre tary o f  De fen s e , and the 
J oint Chiefs of Staff that I am aware of. 
There have been , however , and c ontinue to be basic 
differences of judgement b etwe en Gen eral ?1acArthur , on 
the one hand , and the President , the S e cr e tary of Defense , 
and th• J oint Chiefs of Staff on the other hand . 1 
Marshall told the Sen ators th� t the United Nations forces were 
inflicting terrifi c  casualties on the Chin e s e  Reds and that the 
Reds would •ventually be forc ed to the c onferen c e  table ,  for they 
c ould not a fford to k�•p throwing away th�ir best Army units as 
they were now doing . H• stated his beli ef that the wa"r in Koreta 
must rem�.in as limited a s  possible , that direct attacks on China 
would be def11tating the Uni tead State s ' own policy by incre;· sing 
the rate of ca sualti es , broadening the war ,  and giving the Sovi et 
Union a very legitimate r a a s on for entering th• war , in vi@w of 
the Sino-Sovi et d�fense agreements . He l!!Xpre s s �d hi s belie f th:a t 
thti d;;i.ng er of Sovi f;)t int erventi on was very real and eminent pos­
s ibility. 2 
Sp�aking of  General MacArthur ' s  recall , Marshall said that 
it was no one statem!l!lnt in particular that brought it �bout , but 
an a c cumul�tion of stat ement s chall enging Washington ' s  policy and 
disrupting Allied cooperation which made the re call neces sary. 
J>i1 ",rshall also said that the United States wa s strongly opposed 
to allowing Red China to take c ontrol o f  Formo sa or t o  shoot her 
lH�arings , Part 1 ,  p .  323 . 
2nM.arshall ' s Testimony , "  F'acts on Fil e , May 4-10 , 1951 , 
pp . 146-47 . 
55 
way into th� Unit�d N ation s . H:@ expre s s ed c on fiden ce th.;it the war 
in Koriz,oi_ ,  whi1 111 being unlikely to end a s  a military triurnph , would 
�nd s atis factorily . 1 
T e s timony of th• Joint Chi�fs of Staff 
Spe�.king of Iv:a.cArthur ' s plan to expand the war to Red China , 
Omar Bradley ,  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stafr2 said : 
R�d China is not the powerful nation s eeking to 
dominate the world . Frankly , in the opinion o f  the 
J oint Chie fs o f  Sta ff, this strategy would involve 
us in the wrong war , at the wrong plac• , .at the wrong 
time . 3 
HP- b1plied that the real ern�1:1y of th!'! United Stat fl s  w�.s th0 Soviet 
1Jnion , and that n othing would suit it b@tter than to s e e  the l1nitod 
States b e c ome b ogg ®d down in an Asian l and war . In this ma"0n ar , he 
s aid , the Sovi �t Union could tie up tho United .:>tat e s  force s ,  whil@ 
at the same time l��ving their military might unencumbered . It 
wa s ,  he statt!!d , the opinion of tho J oint Chiefs that the Unit0d 
States policy should be to w�ar out the enemy by inflicting heavy 
l o s ses on their army in Korea and avoid any risk of b•c oming in-
2The J oint Chi l1!l f's of Staff whose functi on it is to advis it  
the PrMident o n  military matters and to work with the N ational 
s �curity Council to pr©par e ,  maintain , and coordinate the military 
programs of th e Unit.!d St ates , c on s ists of th• Chief of Staff for 
each of the s ervices . The J oint Chiefs of Sta.ff is c omposed of 
General of the Army Omar N .  Bradl l!i!y , Chairman ; General J .  Lawton 
Collins , Chi o f  of Staff , United States Army ; General Hoyt S .  V:m­
denberg , Chi e f  of Staff , Unit0d States Air Force ; Admiral Forrest 
P. Sh•rman , Chief of :r:;; aval Op,,.rations . 
3Hearings , Part 2 ,  p .  732 . 
volved in a b igger war . l Bradley als o  clarified th• part played 
by thf!l J oint Chiefs in the recall of }IacArthur . He said th.at the 
J oint Chi e fs never charged Ma cArthur with insubordination . They 
did not suggest his dismissal , but from a military point of view 
they c oncurred in his dismi s s al because his s t� tements showed that 
he wa s not in favor of th@ decision to limit the war to Korea ; h� 
f�iled to c omply with a Presidential directive to clear poli cy 
statements in advan c e ; and his action s were c ontinuing to j e opardi ze 
c ivilian control of the military and it was n e c e s s ary t o  have a 
c ommander more r e sponsive to c ontrol from Washington . 2 In his 
t• stimony Bradl ey answered MacArthur ' s  charg e of tt appeas oment" : 
From a military viewpoint , appeas ement occurs · when 
you give up something , which is rightfully free , to an 
aggre s s or without putting up a struggle , or making him 
pay a price . Forsaking Kor•a- -with-drawing from the 
fight unle s s  we are for ced out--would be appeas em�nt 
to aggr e s sion . Refusing to enlarg e th• quarrel to the 
point where our global capabilitie s are diminished i s  
c ertainly not app e a s ement but is a militarily sound 
c our s e  of a ction under the pre s ent c ircumstances . 3 
Gen"ral Vandenberg , in his testimony , said th� t Mac.Arthur was 
wrong in thinking that R•d China could be b omb ed out of the Kor-
e;;m War . He said 
Air power , and especially the appli c ation of s tra­
tegic air power , should g o  to the he art of the industrial 
c enter s to become reas onably efficient . N ow ,  the s ource 
of the material that is coming t o  the Chinese Communists 
and tho N orth Koreans is from Russia . Therefore , hitting 
acro s s  the Yalu , we could de stroy or lay wa ste all of Man­
churia and the principal citi�s of China if we utili zed 
the full power of the United .Sta.te s Air Forc e • • •  In doing 
ln�l.a cArthur Controver sy" , Facts On Fil e , May 18-24 , 19.51 , p .  162 . 
2�. , p .  163 . 
3uearings , Part 2 ,  p .  733 . 
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that , however , W<tll are boun d to g •t attrition . If we 
utilize li!'SS than th!! full power o f  the United st�.tes Air 
F'orc e ,  in my opinion it mir:ht not and probably would not 
be c onclus ive . 
And even if we util i z ed it and laid W"-St. to it 
there is a p o s s ibility that it would not b� c onclusive , 
But the e ffect on the TJnited St�.tes Air Forc e ,  with our 
start from approxima:tely 40 groups , would fix it s o  that , 
should we naV$ to  op@rate in any oth�r area with full 
power of the United Stat es Air Force , we would not bo 
able to • • •  ( and th<" deft!tnsos of the United States would 
bit ) n:.aked for s @veral years to c omtt . 
The fact is th;it tho Unit�d State s is  operating a 
shows trin e; air fo/.ce in view o f  its global responsibili­
til'ls  • • •  
In my opin i on ,  the United Stat!!! s Air Fore" is the 
s ingfo potential that has kept the balanc e  of power in 
our favor . It is the one thing tha.t has , up to dat e ,  
kept the Russians from d<21ciding t o  g o  to war • • •  
While we can lay the industri al potenti.1i1l of Rus sia 
today to wa st� , in my opinion , or we can lay the Man­
churian c ountryside to waste , a s  well as the principal 
citi es of China , we cannot do both , again becaus l'l we 
have g ot a shoestring air forc e .  l 
Admiral Sh1:,rman , cornmcmting on the proposal for a n;;i,val block-
ade o f  Co:rmnunist China said : 
If the Unit�d �0 ;, tion s  should d0clare a naval blockadll.l , the 
:=tu s si;i.n s  probably would resp(lct it • • •  if the United Sb.tes 
should dceclare a bl ockade unilatera1ly • • •  it is c onc oiv.able 
that they might opp o s e  it by forcc • • •  I do not beli�v© that 
a unilater<1.l Unit�d Stato s  naval bl ockade is advisable .  2 
He stated. that th$ United States must hav(} a co1m;1:a::ider on vhom th�iy 
c o1;_ld rely and to whom the,y c ould con fide , th�refore hill' f�1t that 
l'i�acArthur ' s dismi s s al wa s justified . 
lRobert Lecldet , Conflict : Tho Hi stor of thG Koreiiln War 
( New York : G .  P .  Putman ' s  Sons , 19 2 , pp . 280-81 . 
2urop Hilit;;i ry Thinking on Seven Viti.<.l Questions" , Newswet'!!k ,  
LTune 11 , 1951 , p .  34 . 
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G ener�l Collins t "'i s ti fit�d th.?,t l1acArthur h;;i.d s ent Ainl"'lric!ln 
troops to the Hanchurian frontier th� previous yr.i.ar thus vi olating 
a cl�a.r cut directivo to use only South Korean troops n l!tar the b or-
der . He c ontinued : 
I think this was one indi cation among many others ,  
whi ch certainly have been clear , that General MacArthur 
was not in c onconance with the basic polic i�s that led 
us gradually to fear that just as h• violated a policy 
in this case  without consulting us , perhaps the thing 
might be done in some oth�r instance of a more s erious 
nature . 1 
Testimony of Secretary of State Ache s on 
In the Secretary of State ' s  testimony he clearly de fined the 
purpose of American foreign policy . 
As a peopl e we c ondemn aggre s s ion . We reject appeas ement 
of any kind . If we had stood with our arms folded while 
Korea wa s swallowed up , it would h�ve meant abandoning our 
principles ( and ) the defeat o f  the c oll ective s e curity 
system on which our own safety ultim�tely dopond s .  The 
Four Freedoms , the Atlantic Charter , the United Nations-­
thes e  were not cynical slogans • • • Our people felt in their 
h@arts the principle s  were worth fighting for . It ha s 
b\!en th� purpose of our foreign policy to keep faith with 
tha t idea • • • to deter war if we c an • • •  to help peopl e s  who 
had just regained their ind�p@ndence from losing it again 
to the nGw imperialism of the Sovi et Uni on .  2 
Ach8 s on ,  on June 2 ,  said that J!.facArthur ' s  program for air attacks 
on Red China might v ery well break up the anti- Communist alliance 
if the United States carri ed it out alone , and it probably would 
not win the war . Ha said that our all i e s  are ready to "take tho 
suffering sn of another w.ar if n e c e s sary ,  but they do not want the 
hardships of war to fall on them unneces s arily or by s ome provo­
cation on our part . 3 
lNew York Times , Hay 27 , 1951 , p .  51 . 
2111-lacArthur He�ring s" , Facts on 1''il e , �Tune 1-7 , 1951 , pp . 178-79 . 
31'eisJ. • •  p .  179 . 
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0nilit.ars <i.nd po1itic:;i,1 obj�ctives . ;-II!' said that mili·r,�r;r obj"'ctives 
Wl'lre to rep�l th� arme d attacks and to r ® stort1 pt11a c e  ;,. r,:l sq-?cu rity in 
Korea . Th11 United Stnt� s and th-., United J:fati ons al so hav� l one: 
tl"lri;:i y,>olitical obj e c tivllls--to establish .a fre e , independent and 
d emocratic Korea. .  He made it clear , how9ver , th�.t thfll United Stff.t�s 
was not oblig ed to keep fiiz;hting until this larger objoctiv� was 
� chievod . 1 Ther ®  were six other witn e s s e s  who w0re called to give 
te:� sti.mony befor� the S@'Jn :,1t� cormnittee , but sinclll they do not bear 
on the matter c onc ern�d with in this paper they will bf!! omrnitt ed . 
Conc lusi on of H�arings 
On August 17 , 1951 th� Sen:.i.ts Armed Servic M  C01mi1ittee and the 
For eign Reh.tions Corur.itte «!I  met for th\'!! l:;i st timfii' in .joint s e s s ion 
to conc lude their inve stigation into th� reicall of Gener:..l Mac ­
Arthur :.<.nd the Administration ' s  F:o.r Ba.stern policy . Th• Committ e e  
dec ided by a twenty to thru vote th� t  th� tran s cript of the hear­
in;s s �long with any add�d appendices be sent to thim Senat• , but they 
cl�cidt'td not to fil EJ:  a c omrnittt!! e r ""port due to th• di sagreem11.ff1t 
;i.mong th� members . 
1N ew York Time s , June 6 ,  1951 , p .  15 
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IV CONCLUSION 
John Spanier in .American Foreign Policy Since World !i!.t !!  
points out American frustration with containment . This writer , 
after a study- of the problem, feels that Mr. Spanier has not only 
presented an accurate picture of the situation, but has also pro­
vided the key for explaining the reversal in public opinion sup.. 
porting MacArthur ' s  program. for the Far East. 
It is the opinion of this writer that there was no real change 
in public opinion, that is that there never was any real support 
for MacArthur ' s  proposals . 
When MacArtQ.ur returned to the United States and began . his 
crusade against the Administration, he was only voicing the re­
action of the public to containment. Wherever he went MacArthur 
met esthusiastic receptions and vast outpourings of emotion. While 
the emotions were real, they were not , as MacArthur believed, ex­
pressions of support tor his Far Eastern program.. There were two 
factors which were responsible for this public outbUrst . First, " 
there was a very definite feeling of frustration with containment, 
and most of the emotionalism which MacArthur saw was an expression 
of this discontentment. Second, whatever els• he was MacArthur was 
a hero of the Second World War, and there was a desire on the part 
of the American people to give him the hero ' s  welcome · he hadn ' t  
received at the end o f  the war .  
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When the public began to examine carefully Mac.Arthur ' s  pro­
posals , they found that like containment , his proposals ; would not allow 
them to revert to the traditional preoccupation with domestic 
affairs . The most important factors in b-qrsting the bubble of 
public emotion was the Senate hearings and more specifically the 
unanimous support of Administration policy by the Joint Chiefs 
ot Starr. The hearings forced Americans to face the fact that they 
could no longer withdraw into their shell of domestic tranquillity, 
but were , however much they protested, a part of the world and its 
problems . The testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Start had clearly' 
pointed out the dangers of Mac.Arthur' s proposals , dangers which 
Americans did not want to face needlessly ,  and the fact that there 
was no easy military answer to Korea. 
Thus the public support which MacArthur saw tor his proposals 
was only a llij>'th, a letting off of steam before the American people 
settled down to accept the world responsibilities which they knew 
must come . 
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I. Message .!!:2!! Joint Chiefs EI.. Staff ].2 General MacArthur, December §., 
l:ilQ. 
From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander-in-Chief , Far East, Tokyo , Japan 
( and other commanders ) :  
"l . The President , as of 5 Dec. , forwarded a memo to all Cabinet 
members and to the chairman N . S .R.B. , administrator E. C.A. , director 
C . I.A. , administrator E.S.A. and director Selective Service ,  which 
reads as follows : 
"In the light of the present critical internation situation, 
and until further written notice from me , I wish that each one of 
you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public 
speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials 
of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. This 
applies to officials in the field as well as those in Washington.  
" 'No speech , press release , or other public statement concern­
ing foreign policy whould be released until it has received clear­
ance from the Department of State . 
" 'No speech, press release , or other statement concerning 
military policy should be released until it has received clearance 
from the Department of Defense . 
" ' In  addition to the copies submitted to the Departments of 
State and Defense for clearance ,  advance copies of speeches and 
press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should 
be submitted to the White House for information. 
" ' The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of 
information to the American people , but rather to insure that the 
information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the 
policies of the United States Government. 
"2 . He also forwarded the following to the Secretary of state 
and Secretary of Defense : 
" ' In  addition to the policy expressed in my memorandum of this 
date to the heads of departments , concerning the clearance of 
speeches and statements , I wish the following steps to be taken : 
" ' Officials overseas , including military commanders and diplo­
matic representatives ,  should be ordered to exercise extreme 
caution in public statements ,  to clear all but routine statements 
with their departments ,  and to refrain from direct communication 
on military of foreign policy with newspapers ,  magazines or other 
publicity media in the United States . •  
") . The above is transmitted to you for guidance and appro­
priate action . " 
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II. Message !£2! Joint Chiefs .2! Sta.ft � General MacArthur, March z.2, 
�· 
TO: Comander in Chiet, Far East , Tolc1'o,  Japan 
FROM: Joint Chiefs of Sta.ft 
State planning presidential announcement shortly that, with clear­
ing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors , United Nations now prepared 
to discuss · conditions of settlement in Iorea. Strong U.N . fee�ing 
persists that further diplomatic effort towards settlement should 
be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th parallel. 
Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit 
new negotiations that may develop. Recognising that parallel has 
no military significance , State has asked JCS what authority you 
should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks 
to provide security for U . N .  forces and maintain contact with enemy. 
Your reconaendations desired. 
m. Statement !a! General Macpthur, March �. 122!• 
Operations continue according to schedule and plan .  We haft 
now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Co�ist fQrces.  
It is becoming increasingly evident that the heav des.truction .along 
the enenw• s lines of supply caused by our • round-the-clock :massive 
air and naval bombardment , has lett his troops in the forward battle 
area deticient in requirements to sustain his operations . 
This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground 
torces . The eneJl'J1'' S human wave tactics definitely tailed him as our 
own forces become seasoned to this form of . warfare ; his tactics of 
1ntiltration : are but contributing to his piecemeal losses ; and he 
is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of cl:i,mate, 
terrain, and battle. 
Of even greater significance then our tactical success has been 
the clear revelation that this new eneJQ', Red China , ot such exag­
gerated and vaunted militaey power , lacks the industrial :capacity 
to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct 
of modern war .  
. 
He lacks manufacturing bases and those raw materials needed to 
produce , maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, 
and he cannot provide the essentials tor successful ground QPe�­
ations , such as tanks , heavy artilleey and other refinements science 
has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns . 
Formerly his great numerical potential might well have tilled 
this gap, but with . the development of existing methods of lll&SS 
destruction, numbers alone do not otfset vulnerability inherent in 
such deficiences . , Control of the sea and air, which in turn means 
control over suppl�es,  communications and transportation , are no 
less essential and decisive now than in the past. 
I .  
When this control exists . as in our case , and is coupled with 
the inferiority of graand firepower, as in the eneiv• s case , the 
resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bracery, 
however fanatical , or the most gross indifference to human loss .  
These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely 
revealed since Red China entered upon it� tmdeclared war in Korea . 
Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United 
Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which 
accrue to Red China , it has been shown its complete inability to 
accomplish b:r force of arms the conquest of Korea . 
The enem;y therefore must by now be painfully aware that a 
decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort 
to contain the var to the area of Korea through expansion of our 
military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would 
doom Red China to the rish of iminent military collapse . 
These basic facts being established, there should be no in­
superable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean prti>blem 
if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being 
burdened b7 extraneous matters not directly related to Korea , , such 
as Formosa and .. Chtna ' s  seat in the United Nations . 
The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly 
ravaged must not be sacrificed . That 'is the paramount concern. A­
part from the military area of the problem where the issues are 
resolved in the oourse of combat , the fundamental questions continue 
to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplo-. 
· matic sphere . 
Within the area of '!lf9' authorit;r as military commander , however , 
it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer 
in the field with the commander in chief or the enem;r forces · '. in  an 
earnest effort · to find any militar;r means whereb;r - the realieation 
of the political obj ectives of the United Nations in Korea , to 
which no nation may jUstly take exceptions , might be accomplished 
without furthef bi�odshed. 
· 
IV. Messa.ge from · Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Mac.Arthur , 
March �, -� - - · · 
r 
To : Commander in Chief, Far la.st , Tokyo, Japan 
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff, personal for MacArthur 
The President has directed that your attention be called to 
his order as transmitted 6 December 1950 . In view of the infor­
mation given ;rou 20 March 1951 any further statements by you must 
be co-ordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December . 
The President has also directed that in the eyent Communist 
militar;r leaders request an armistice in the field , you immediately 
report that fact to the JCS for instructions . 
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V. Letters exchanged E£ Honorable Joseph _!!. Martin, it:.• .!;lli! 
General MacArthur , March 12.2!• 
( 1 )  Letter from Honorable Joseph W. Martin , Jr . to General MacArthur , 
March 8 ,  1951 . 
M;v" Dear General : In the current discussions on foreign policy and 
overall strategy many of us have been distressed that , although the 
European aspects have been heavily emphasized , we have been without 
the views of yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern 
Command. 
I think it is imperative to the security of our Nation and for 
the safety of the world that policies of the United States em.brace 
the broadest possible strategy and that in our earnest desire to 
protect Europe we not weaken our position in Asia.  
Enclosed is acopy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N . Y. , 
February 12 , stressing this vital point and suggesting that the 
forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be 
employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the 
pressure on our forces in Korea. 
I have since repeated the essence of this thesis in other 
speeches , and intend to do so again on March 21, when I will be on 
a radio hook-up. 
I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this 
point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers 
are legion , and the respect you command is enormous . May success 
be your in the gigantic undertaking which you direct. 
Sincerely yours , 
Joseph W. Martin, Jr . 
( 2 )  Reply thereto by General MacArthur, March 20 , 1951. 
Dear Congressman Martin : I am most grateful for your note of the 
8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12 . The latter 
I have read with much interest ,  and find that with the passage of 
years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch. 
My views and recollllllendations with respect to the situation 
created by Red China ' s  entry into war against us in Korea have 
been submitted to Washington in most complete detail . Generally 
these views are well known and clearly understood, as  they follow 
the conventional patte� of meeting force with maximum counter­
force as we have never failed to do in the past.  Your view with 
respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in 
conflict with neither logic nor this tradition .  
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It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in 
Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their 
play for global conques t ,  and that we have joined the issue thus 
raised on the battlefield; that there we fight Eu.rope ' s  war with 
arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words ; that if 
we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevi­
table , win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet 
pres erve freedom. As you pointed out , we must win. There is no 
substitute for victory . 
With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard , I 
am, 
Faithfully yours ,  
Douglas MacArthur 
VI .  Statement o f  the President Relative t o  the Relief of General 
Mac.Arthur , April 10 , 1951. , 
With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army' 
Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the 
policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations 
in matters pertaining to his offic:i,al dutie s .  In view of the 
specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of 
the United States and the added responsibility which has been en­
trusted to me by the United Nations , I have decided that I must 
make a change of command in the Far East . I have , therefore , 
relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt . 
Gen . Matthew B .  Ridgway as his successor . 
Full and , vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a 
vital element in the constitutional system of our fre e  democracy. 
It is fundamental , however , that miltiary col1111'1anders must be 
governed by the policies and directives i�sued to them in the man­
ner provided by our laws and Constitution . In time of crisis , this 
consideration is particularly compelling. 
General Mac.Arthur ' s  place in history as one of our greatest 
commanders if fully established. The nation owes him a debt of 
gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he 
has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For 
that reasnn I repeat my regret at the nece s s ity for the action I 
feel compelled 1 to take in this case . 
VII . Radio Address of the President Relative to the Relief of General 
MacArthur, April g� .!.221· 
- - -
I want to talk , plainly to you tonight about what we are doing 
in Korea and about our policy in the Far East . 
In the simplest terms , what we are doing in Korea is this : 
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I think most people in this country recognized that fact last 
June . .And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to 
help the Republic of Korea against the CollRlUllist aggressors . Now, 
many persons , even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea , 
have forgotten the basic reason for our action. 
It is right for us to be in Korea , It was right last June. It 
is right today. 
I want to remind you why this is true . 
The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous 
conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. It they were 
to succeed , the United States would be numbered among their 
principal. victims . It must be clear to everyone that the United 
States cannot -- and will not -- sit idly by and await foreign con­
quest . The only question is : When is the best time to meet the 
threat and how is the best way to meet it? 
The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning . It is 
easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than 
after it has become a roaring blaze . 
And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is tor the 
peaceloving nations to act together. If they don ' t act together , 
they are likely to be picked off, one by one . 
If they had followed the right policies in the 19)0 ' s  -- it the 
tree countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the 
dictators and if they had acted in the beginning , when the aggres­
sion was small -- there probably would have been no World War II. 
It history has taught us anything , it is that aggression any­
where in the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world. 
When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers 
of a powertul nation who are bent on conquest , it becomes a clear 
and present danger to the security and independence ot every tree 
nation. 
This is a lesson that most people in this country have 
learned thoroughly. Xhis is the basic reason why we joined in 
creating the United Nations . And, since the end of World War II ,  
we have been putting that les s on into practice -- we have been 
working with other tree nations to check the aggressive designs 
ot the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war. 
That is what we did in Greece , when that nation was threatened 
by the aggression or international communism. 
The attack against Greece could have led to general war . But 
this country came to the aid of Greece . The United Nations SUP-
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ported Greek resistance. With our help , the determination and 
efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot . 
Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade . 
That too could have led to war .  But again it was settled because 
tree men .would not back down in an emergency. 
The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous 
move the Communists have yet made . 
The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering 
all of Asia. 
I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report 
which came to us after the attack . It is a r eport of a speech a 
Communist army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and 
saboteurs last May, one month before South Korea was invaded . The· 
report shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a care­
fully prepared plot . Here is part of what the Communist officer , 
who had been trained in Moscow, told his men : "Our forces , "  he 
said , "are scheduled to attack South Korean forces about the middle 
of June • • •  the coming attack on South Korea marks the first step 
toward liberation of Asia . "  
Notice that he used the word "liberation. " That is Communist 
double-talk meaning "conquest . "  
I have another secret intelligence report here . This one tells 
what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several 
months before the invasion of Korea . Here is what he said: "In 
order to successtully undertake the long awaited world revolution , 
we must first unify Asia • • • Java, Indo-China , .Malaya , Tibet , Thai­
land , Philippines ,  and Japan are our ultimate targets • • • the United 
States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all 
countries in southeast Asia. In other words , we must unify the 
people of Asia and crush the United States . "  
That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people , 
and that is what they have been trying to do . 
Again ,  "liberation" in Commie language ,  means "conquest . "  
They want to control all Asia f'rom the Kremlin . 
This plan of conquest is in fiat contradiction to what we 
believe . We believe that Korea belongs to the Koreans . We believe 
that India belongs to the Indians . We believe that 81.l the nations 
of Asia should be tree to work out their affairs in their own way. 
This is the basis of peace in the Far East and it is the basis of 
peace everywhere else . 
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The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace 
in the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped 
the North Koreans for aggression .  The Chinese Communists :massed 
44 well-trained and well-equipped divisions on the Korean frontier. 
These were the troops they threw into battle when the North Korean 
Communists were beaten. 
The question we have to face is whether the Communist plan of 
conquest can be stopped without general war . Our Government and 
other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe 
that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet 
the attack in Korea and defeat it there. 
task. 
That is what we have been doing . It is a difficult and bitter 
But so far it has been successful. 
So far , we have prevented World War III . 
So far ,  by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented 
aggression from succeeding , and bringing on a general war . And the 
ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has 
been greatly improved.  
We have taught the enemy a lesson .  He  has found out that 
aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world 
who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope . 
They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight 
and that they will stand up and fight. 
Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom 
now fighting in Indo-China and other countries in that part of the 
world. It has already slowed down the time-table of conquest. 
In Korea itself, there are signs that the enellliY is building 
up his ground forces for a new mass offensive . We also know that 
there have been large increases in the enenzy-• s available air forces . 
If a new attack comes I feel confident it will be turned back. 
The United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well 
equipped. They are fighting for a just cause .  They are proving 
to all the world that the principle of collective security will 
work. We are proud of all these forces for the magnificent job 
they have done against heavy odds . We pray that their efforts may 
succeed, for upon their success may hinge the peace of the world. 
The Communist side must now choose its course of action. The 
Communist rulers may press the attack against us . They may take 
further action which will spread the conflict. They have that 
choice ,  and with it the awful responsibility for what :may follow. 
The Communists also have the choice of a peaceful settlement which 
could lead to a general relaxation of tensions in the Far East.  
The decision is theirs , because the forces of the United Nations 
will strive to limit the conflict if possible. 
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We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended . We are 
trying to prevent a world war -- not to start one . The best way 
to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries 
will continue to resist the attack . 
But you may ask why can ' t  we take other steps to punish the 
aggress or . Why don ' t  we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why 
don ' t  we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland 
of China? 
If we were to do th�se thing s we would be running a very grave 
risk of starting a general war . If that were to happen , we would 
have brought about the exact situation we are tying to prevent . 
If we were to do these thing s ,  we would become entangled in a 
vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become 
immeasurably more difficult all over the world. 
What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for 
our military forces to be committed to a full scale war with Red 
China? 
It may well be that , in spite of our best efforts , the Com­
munists may spread the war . But it would be wrong -- tragically 
wrong -- for us to take the initiative in extending the war . 
The dangers are great .  Make no mistake about it . Behind the 
North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand 1 
additional millions of Chinese soldiers . And behind the Chinese 
stand the tanks , the planes ,  the submarines , the soldiers ,  and the 
scheming rulers of the Soviet Union. 
Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict . 
The course we have been following is the one best calculated 
to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our 
obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and 
security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the 
most effective course of action we can follow. 
First of all , it is clear that our efforts. ·  in Korea can blunt 
the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle . The 
United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and 
have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are 
stronger now than they have been before . These are plain facts 
which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their 
attack . 
Second , the free world as a whole is growing in military 
strength every day. In the United States , in western Europe , and 
throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and 
are building their defenses . This may discourage the Communist 
rulers from continuing the war in Korea -- and from undertaking 
new acts of aggression els ewhere . 
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If the Communists authorities realize that they cannot defeat 
us in Korea , if they realize it would be foolhard1' to widen the 
hostilities beyond Korea , then they may recognize the folly of 
continuing their aggression . A peaceful settlement may then be 
possible . The door is always open . 
Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not com­
promise the principles and purposes of the United Nations . 
I have thought long and hard about this question of extending 
the war in Asia . I have discussed it many times with the ablest 
military advisers in the country. I believe with all JQ" heart 
that the course we are following is the best course .  
I believe that we must tr,y t o  limit the war to Korea for these 
vital reasons : To make sure that the precious lives of our fight­
ing men are not wasted, to see that the security of our country and 
the free world is not needlessly jeopardized and to prevent a third 
world war. 
A number of events have made it evident that General Mac.Arthur 
did not agree with that policy. I have , therefore , considered it 
essential to relieve General Mic.Arthur so that there would be no 
doubt or contusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy. 
It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself 
compelled to take this action , General MacArthur is one of our 
greatest military commanders . But the cause of world peace is more 
important than any individual . 
The change in commands in the Far East means no change what­
ever in the policy of the United States . We will carry on the 
fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring 
the war to a speedy and successful conclusion . 
The new commander , Lieut . Gen . Matthew Ridgway. has already 
demonstrated that he has the great qualities of leadership needed 
tor this task. 
We are ready, at any time , to negotiate for a restoration or 
peace in the area .  But we will not engage in appeasement . We are 
only interested in real peace . 
· 
Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the 
following factors : 
One: The fighting must stop . 
Two : Concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting 
will not break out again . 
Three : There must be an end to the aggres sion. 
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A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way 
for the unification ot Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces . 
In the meantime , I want to be clear about our military 
objective . We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in 
Korea . We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading 
to other areas . But at the same time we nm.st conduct our military 
activities so as to insure the security of our forces .  This is 
essential if they'. · are to continue the tight until the eneiq · 
abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of · Ko:tea. 
That is our military objective -- to repel attack and to 
restore peace . 
In the hard fighting in Korea , we are proving that collective 
action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable 
means ot resisting aggression .  Defeat ot aggression in Korea may 
be the turning point in the world' s search for a practical way ot 
achieving peace and security . 
The struggle or the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for 
peace . 
The tree nations have united their strength in an effort to 
prevent a third world war . 
That war can come if the Communist rulers wa.nt 1 t to come . But 
this Nation and its allies vi1l not be responsible for its coming . 
We do not want to widen the conf'lict . We will use eveey effort 
to prevent that dii;saster . And in so doing, we lmow that we are 
following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice . 
as 
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